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ABSTRACT 
This thesis assesses the rise of Brazil as a global power. To examine this, the research takes 
an international relations approach to measure power in terms of a state’s ability to 
influence other states. Three aspects that this research focuses on are wealth, land power, 
and international influence. These characteristics separate “hegemons,” “global,” “middle,” 
and “regional” powers. Brazil’s rise to global power started with instituting neoliberal 
reform, which produced the economic growth over the last 20 years, and has translated into 
the ability to domestically and globally invest in poverty and disease reduction programs 
across Latin America and Africa.   
With the strongest military in Latin America, Brazil has difficulty acquiring new 
technology and military assets because no direct security threat exists. Foreign policy 
desires a projection of force, while defense spending limits the military to internal security. 
Brazil’s role in international organizations provides many opportunities to exert leadership, 
but each organization limits the level of Brazilian influence. This thesis finds that Brazil, 
although strong economically, is still a middle power with aspirations of global power, 
based on a difference in its material capabilities and ability to continually exercise 
economic and political influence outside the Latin American region.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Brazilian economy has expanded substantially in the past decade and, 
according to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), it is now officially 
the seventh largest economy in the world.1 Moreover, Brazil’s large supply of commodities 
(including oil, minerals, and ethanol, among others) has given the country a special trade 
status to influence world prices of key raw materials. Given its economic expansion, has 
Brazil finally achieved global power status? If not, what indicators are lacking for 
consideration of Brazil as a global power?   
This thesis explores Brazil’s role in global politics and critically assesses how its 
policy influences world economic dynamics. Historically, this subject has inspired 
scholarly work in the role of world and so-called “emerging powers.” In 1941, Stefan 
Zweig described Brazil as “the country of the future”2 This internationally accepted 
assessment of Brazil’s potential is frequently mustered, ironically, to dismiss a nation that 
has been historically plagued with high inflation and entrenched corruption.3 The recent 
classification of Brazil, together with Russia, India, and China as the so-called BRIC 
countries with the largest emerging economies, however, seems to indicate that the 
“country of the future” has become a force worth recognizing in the present. Various 
analysts believe that Brazil has finally achieved global economic power status, since the 
country is also a member of the Group of 8 (G-8), a forum for the governments of the 
world’s eight most powerful economies, as well as many other influential associations. 
Riordan Roett cites that Brazil is a “crafty superpower” with major regional power 
                                                 
1 The World Bank, GDP (Current U.S. $), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator /NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 
?order=wbapi_data_value _2012+wbapi_data_value +wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc. 
2 Stefan Zweig, Brazil a Land of the Future (Riverside, CA: Ariadne Press, 2000). 
3 Simon Romero, “Fresh Look for Author, and For Land He Lauded,” The New York Times, November 
21, 2011. 
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capabilities but so far lacks the vision for achieving global power status, even as the current 
administration struggles to find one.4  
Although most of the literature refers to Brazil as an “emerging power,” the 
evidence supporting its arrival as a “global power” is inconclusive at best. This study aims 
to answer one question: Has Brazil achieved global power status via the expansion of its 
economic capabilities? In answering this question, a theoretical framework is required to 
define a global power. If Brazil is not a global power, then where does it stand on the scale 
of power?5 Robert Dahl defines power as follows: “A has power over B to the extent that 
he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”6 The focus of this research, 
therefore, will be on Brazil’s ability to influence or alter the actions of other countries 
regionally and globally.  
International relations scholars disagree about the elements of state power. States 
with significant amounts of power (hard or soft) within the international system are referred 
to by Michael Haas as minor, middle, upper middle, regional, global, or superpowers.7 The 
problem is that there is neither a concrete or commonly accepted definition of global 
power, nor a unifying theory that explains the thresholds or defining characteristics for each 
of the levels of power. Subsequently, this research will differentiate between the levels of 
power and analyze where Brazil ranks—ultimately determining whether Brazil has arrived 
at a global power status. In doing so, this thesis analyzes three primary and fungible aspects 





                                                 
4 Riordan Roett, The New Brazil (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 143; Roett 
cites Newsweek article from 2009; Mac Margolis, “The Crafty Superpower,’’ Newsweek, April 27, 2009. 
5 Michael Haas, International Systems: A Behavioral Approach. (New York: Chandler, 1973), 15. By 
defining power as the potential to enforce decisions on others even against their will, one can distinguish 
between minor, middle, and major powers, depending on their ability to defeat other countries on the 
battlefield.  
6 Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957), 201–202.  
7 Haas, International Systems: A Behavioral Approach, 15. 
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strength); and international influence (trade/role in IOs/alliances). Wealth, land power, and 
international influence will be evaluated as the quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
power.8 
B. IMPORTANCE 
In world affairs, there are always changes and transformations of the international 
system, whereby the balance of power becomes challenged by emerging or competitor 
nations. As Robert Gilpin argues, “The interests of individual actors and the balance of 
power among the actors do change as a result of economic, technological, and other 
developments.”9 Paul Kennedy adds that uneven growth rates along with technological and 
organizational breakthroughs provide additional variables to the relative strength of great 
powers in world affairs.10 In recent history, the Cold War exemplifies a bipolar 
international system where the Soviet Union and United States were the two greatest 
powers. Since the end of the Cold War, a plethora of economies and democracies have 
emerged to challenge the hegemony of the United States. Moreover, there is a growing 
consensus in the academic community that points to a transformation of world affairs, in 
which the United States will no longer be the hegemon. Some scholars have speculated that 
emerging economic countries, such as Brazil, will be the leading powers of tomorrow. This 
thesis analyzes the extent to which Brazil’s power has expanded to fill the anticipated 
erosion of U.S. hegemony as a systemic impact on the balance of power.     
Since the nineteenth century, Latin America has been relatively disengaged from 
major world events, including World War I and World War II. While Mexico sent a fighter 
squadron to the Pacific in 1945 and the Colombian Navy participated in anti-U-boat 
operations in the Caribbean, Brazil was the only Latin American country to send troops to 
                                                 
8 Measurement of power is derived from a combination of realist and liberal attributes from the 
previous work of John Mearsheimer (2001), Bruce Russett, John Oneal (2001), Michael Hass (1973), and 
Carsten Holbraad (1984) in their work on ranking states according to power. 
9 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 9.  
10 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House Digital, 2010), 
15.  
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Europe during World War II.11 Post-1945, however, Latin America was too consumed by 
its own political quarrels, economic dislocation, and internal challenges to stability to play 
a significant role on the world stage. Indeed, until very recently, it was fashionable in 
academic circles to contrast the stunning economic surge of East Asia since the 1950s with 
that of the once superior Latin American economies.12 The surge of Brazil’s economy with 
the concomitant rise in Brasília’s political influence may offer a harbinger of the Latin 
American region’s increasing role in world affairs. To assess that, one must be able to 
measure it, which explains why this research is important as it seeks to explore the extent to 
which a regional power matters at the systemic level.   
Finally, this research anticipates increasing knowledge of Brazil’s foreign policy 
decision-making process. As elsewhere, Brazil’s potential influence and power is driven at 
least in part by domestic political factors, a dimension that has been overlooked by the 
conventional international relations (IR) literature. This research will analyze the extent to 
which these domestic factors shape and influence the role of Brazil in world affairs.     
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The research conducted for this analysis of Brazil is primarily limited to analyzing 
sources in English. This may pose methodological problems since the author will be 
relying largely on data published by the Brazilian government. Even with this limitation, 
this research offers the advantage of critically assessing the various theoretical approaches 
to power, which are primarily established in the developed world (and published in 
English).  
Another potential shortcoming in this research area is that scholarly work on power 
is inconsistent or contentious. David Baldwin argues that international relations theorists 
                                                 
11 Robert L. Scheina, Latin America's Wars Volume II: The Age of the Professional Soldier, 1900-
2001 (Virginia: Potomac Books, 2003), 164–165.  
12 Anthony Elson, “The Economic Growth of East Asia and Latin America in Comparative 







have disagreed about the role and nature of power.13 He quotes Kenneth Waltz, Robert 
Gilpin, Hans Morgenthau, John Mearsheimer, and David Carr as a few of the scholars 
involved in the controversy over the definition of power. For the purpose of this research, 
power will be defined as Brazil’s ability to influence other countries regionally and 
globally on economic and security issues. In addition, power will be measured through 
wealth, land power, and influence within international organizations.   
International relations scholars explicitly define the role and behavior of the state in 
terms of power, security, alliances, and influence in international organizations. An 
analysis of this behavior will build the thresholds and categorize each of the levels of 
power to determine when a state transitions to a different power level.  
Additionally, most of the international relations literature refers to Brazil as an 
emerging power, a middle power, or the “land of the future.”14 These classifications lack 
clear definitions and quantitative analysis accurately to categorize states in each of the 
levels of power. Furthermore, much of the literature available on power analysis in world 
politics is inconsistent, uses various conceptual definitions, and relies on differing data to 
rank countries.  
Because there are several ways of assessing power capabilities in world affairs, one 
should also expect variations in assessments of how Brazil exercises its influence. As a 
result, one can identify three different forms in which Brazil’s world influence and power 
can be assessed: military capabilities, economic capacity, and soft power diplomacy.  
Using John Mearsheimer and Bruce Russett’s characteristics, military capabilities 
can be measured through resources, size of force, energy consumption, and strength of 
military.15 Economic capacity can be measured through resources, population size, GDP, 
                                                 
13 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, 
ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE Publishing Co., 2002), 177 
14 Stefan Zweig, Brazil a Land of the Future (Riverside: Ariadne Press, 2000). 
15 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton Press, 2001) 143–
145; Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: Norton Press, 2001), 35. 
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purchasing power, and overall balance of trade. Soft power diplomacy can be measured 
through trade, role in international organizations (IOs), alliances, and cultural influences.16  
On this basis, one can posit the following hypotheses: Brazil’s power falls 
somewhere among the definitions of a hegemon, a global power, a middle-ranking power, 
or a regional power. This research will focus on global power, middle power, and regional 
power status as providing the most accurate definitions. A hegemon exists in a unipolar or 
bipolar international system. Gilpin defines hegemons as “a single powerful state that 
controls or dominates the lesser states in the system.”17 More specifically, a hegemon is a 
country that by virtue of its size, diplomatic and military influence can shape the 
international system. Pax Romana, Pax Britannica, and Pax Americana are examples of 
hegemons in a unipolar system.  
A bipolar system—Athens-Sparta, United States-Great Britain, or United States-
Soviet Union—offers classic examples of two powerful states that influence or dominate 
the international system and their respective regions at a given time. The hypothesis that 
Brazil has acquired substantial diplomatic and military influence to shape world affairs, 
including polarity and international conflict and cooperation as a hegemonic power, is not 
defensible because the majority of scholarly work on hegemons and popular opinion today 
conclude that the United States is the only current hegemon. However, with the relative 
decline in U.S. hegemony, the international system appears to be shifting toward a multi-
polar system.    
The first hypothesis is that Brazil is a global or world power. These two types of 
powers exist in a structure known as balance of power, “in which three or more states 
control one another’s actions through diplomatic maneuver, shifting alliances, and open 
conflict.”18 In other words, balance of power is a collective system or concert of power in a 
multipolar system. 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 29.  
18 Ibid. 
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Additionally, in a multipolar system there are middle powers. The second 
hypothesis is that Brazil is a middle power. Carsten Holbraad defines middle powers as 
“locally prominent actors, who may be sought as allies by major powers but who are never 
leaders of a subsystem.”19 Middle powers are not considered world powers, as they have 
restrained their influence by issue and capability: not being military powers, they limit their 
influence in international organizations strictly through exercising diplomacy. Joshua 
Goldstein and Jon Pevehouse describe middle powers as “large but not highly 
industrialized [states]; others have specialized capabilities but are small.”20 Middle powers 
have enough diplomacy and capabilities to be heard, but they lack the power to influence 
and shape the international system because they rank below the great powers.  
The third hypothesis is that Brazil is a regional power. These powers are limited to 
influence and power within a specific region, but not beyond. Middle powers are often 
regional powers, but the opposite is not always true. Regional powers are defined by 
Øyvind Østerud as “a state, (1) that is geographically part of a delineated region, (2) that is 
able to stand up against any coalition of other states in the region, (3) that is highly 
influential in regional affairs, and (4) that, contrary to a middle power, might also be a great 
power on the world scale in addition to its regional standing.”21  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is divided into two sections. The first section lays the 
foundation for theoretical frameworks on power. The second section builds on this 
foundation and adds the arguments of scholarly work on Brazil’s power status.   
In an attempt to analyze the global power status of Brazil, a theoretical framework 
must be established to measure power. John Mearsheimer, an offensive realist, lays the 
                                                 
19 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 
73. 
20 Joshua S. Goldstein, Jon C. Pevehouse, and Scott Sernau, Principles of International Relations 
(Pearson Longman, 2008), 79–80.  
21 Øyvind Østerud, “Regional Great Powers,” in Regional Great Powers in International Politics, 
International Politics, ed. Iver B. Neumann (Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 12. 
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foundation of global powers based on hard power—economic and military capabilities.22 
More specifically, he argues that regional hegemony, wealth, pre-eminent land power, and 
nuclear superiority are the characteristics of a global power.23 If these characteristics were 
an all-inclusive list, then the U.S., China, Russia, Germany, and Japan are arguably the 
only current global powers.  
The issue that remains is that these characteristics omit extremely politically and 
economically powerful states that require more attention. Pakistan and India are nuclear 
power states with a considerable amount of wealth and military power, but are not 
considered global powers. France and the United Kingdom are members of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) and have nuclear capabilities, but both countries are not 
considered global powers because they lack regional hegemony. Mearsheimer’s focus also 
ignores the applicability of soft power. Joseph Nye argues that soft power is “the ability to 
affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting 
positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”24 In essence, soft power and hard 
power are measurable through military force because the capabilities achieved have similar 
defining characteristics.  
The Kantian triangle is based on Immanuel Kant’s idea of perpetual peace.25 The 
idea of perpetual peace argues that in places where government is based on public consent, 
there is reluctance to go to war, because the burden of debt and hardships that war imposes 
on the citizens is too high. The Kantian triangle positions IOs, democracy, and economic 
interdependence on the three apexes.26 The triangle assumes that a state’s behavior is 
                                                 
22 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 143–145. 
23 Ibid. Mearsheimer defines offensive realism as a state’s propensity to seek maximum relative power 
in order to achieve hegemony. Pre-eminent land power is based on size and strength of a states military and 
resources that can be converted to a war fighting effort.  
24 Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 20–21. 
25 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 35–40. 
26 Ibid. A summarized version of Russett and Oneal definition of the Kantian triangle: If a single apex 
of the triangle is not enough to guarantee peace and cooperation, combining the elements reinforces the 
global propensity toward international cooperation and peace. When used together (increased involvement 
in IOs, democracy, and economic integration), the characteristics of the Kantian triangle can replace the 
inherent fear, mistrust, and conflict with shared interests and cooperation produced by the mutually 
reinforcing impact of all three apexes of the triangle.  
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shaped by the increasing of one or more apexes of the triangle to increase the third toward 
the center resulting in democratic peace. A counter argument is that China is a non-
democratic state with relative peaceful existence, which downgrades the relevance of 
democracy as a primary characteristic to achieve peace. Power is then defined according to 
six characteristics: a state’s share of the international systems total population, size of the 
urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military manpower, and 
military expenditures.27 From a liberal perspective, Bruce Russett and John Oneal argue 
that soft power vis-à-vis the Kantian triangle is equally important to defining what it means 
to be a global power. This liberal approach assumes that the international system is 
structured, and peace is achieved through increasing a state’s role in IOs, democratizing, 
and creating economic interdependence.28 
In addition, Michael Haas provides a theoretical base for the levels of power. He 
argues that powers are divided into three categories: minor, middle, and major.29 
Additionally, Haas places the U.S. and the former Soviet Union as the only recent 
superpowers based on nuclear superiority.30 The gap in his classification is that he fails to 
address and define a threshold for the characteristics of each level of power. The 
aforementioned empirical frameworks provide a means to classify states according to three 
major categories of characteristics.  
Carsten Holbraad provides a further analysis of Haas’ levels of power. Holbraad 
argues that middle powers are “locally prominent actors, who may be sought as allies by 
major powers but who are never leaders of a subsystem.”31 Holbraad’s study of middle 
powers ranks states according to gross national product (GNP) and population size. This 
approach oversimplifies the ranking system and places 18 developed countries into the 
category of middle powers with data from the early 1980s. Canada’s population of 22 
million and Nigeria’s GNP of $22 million set the lower limit, while China’s population of 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 103. 
28 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 35.  
29 Haas, International Systems: A Behavioral Approach, 15. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 
73. Holbraad’s statistics for gross national product and population sizes is from 1983.  
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822 million and Japan’s GNP of 496 million provide the upper limit—the U.S. and USSR 
were again separated as the two global powers.32 Holbraad’s analysis of global powers has 
two problems. First, the USSR no longer exists. Second, Russia currently has the lowest 
gross domestic product (GDP) of all the members in the G8 (group of eight of the world’s 
largest economies). This three-tier framework proposed Holbraad’s characteristics under 
the category of wealth while adding purchasing power.   
The gap in Holbraad’s study is that the figures represent empirical data from 1975 
and omit other measurable factors of power. This thesis will build on Holbraad’s study and 
add energy consumption, purchasing power (PPP), and influence in IOs to measure power 
and provide a more up-to-date analysis. Energy consumption, PPP, and influence in IOs are 
three measurable factors that Russett and O’Neal provide to add significant importance vis-
à-vis military capabilities and power, because they can transform resources to hard power 
capabilities.33 Russett and O’Neal argue that “from 1885−1992, Great Britain, France, and 
Russia/Soviet Union” were great powers.34 From the formation of the European Union 
(EU) and the fall of the Soviet Union, the previously mentioned countries surrendered or 
lost the great power status. For Russett and O’Neal, the U.S. and China are currently the 
only global powers.35   
According to Lyman Miller, a superpower is “a country that has the capacity to 
project dominating power and influence anywhere in the world, and sometimes, in more 
than one region of the globe at a time, and so may plausibly attain the status of global 
hegemon.”36 From Miller’s definition based on military, economic, political, and cultural 
influence, the U.S. is the sole superpower, with China as a possibility of emerging in the 
future. He argues that other strong military and economic countries are regional powers 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 82–88.  
33 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 103. 
34 Ibid., 101–102. 
35 Ibid., 102. 
36 Lyman Miller, “China an Emerging Superpower?” Stanford Journal of International Relations 6, 
no. 1 (Winter 2005). http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.03_miller.html. Lyman Miller is a research 
fellow at the Hoover Institution and an associate professor in National Security Affairs at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. His research focuses on the foreign policy and domestic 
politics of China, and on East Asian international relations. 
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too. The gap in his study on China as an emerging superpower fails to address weak, 
middle, and global powers. Political and cultural influences are also difficult to measure 
empirically, which is why these characteristics will serve as a qualitative means to measure 
soft power. An example of this soft power is how Miller argues that China’s most 
significant diplomatic role is on the UNSC for political influence.37    
In analyzing Brazil’s global status, scholars highlight the country’s 
accomplishments but fail to agree on its power status. For example, Elena Lazarou points 
out that Brazil is the EU’s fifth largest foreign investor, the EU is a recipient of IMF funds, 
and the recent shift of Brazil to creditor of the IMF all contribute to a less asymmetrical 
economic relationship.38 In this example, Brazil is exercising soft power beyond its 
geographic region through investments in the IMF and EU. Lazarou fails to mention 
whether this contributes to a shift in the balance of power, or Brazil is increasing its overall 
power status in the global arena. Brazil and the EU benefit from a mutual relationship in 
which Brazil can relate to the EU on more balanced terms, an indicator of Brazil’s status as 
an emerging global power.39 Further analysis of what a global power is will draw from the 
work of David Baldwin, who argues that in order to define power, we must first identity the 
scope and domain in question.40 For this analysis, the scope and domain will be measured 
in terms of Brazil’s ability to influence states in the global arena.   
Now that the theoretical framework has been established, I will turn toward the 
scholarly work on Brazil’s power status. Bernardo Sorj and Sergio Fausto analyze the 
importance of Brazil as a regional power. They argue that Brazil has an important role to 
play in South American integration because of its geography, economy, and political 
stability.41 Sorj and Fausto view Brazilian regional integration as a means to increase its 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Elena Lazarou, “The Sixth EU-Brazil Summit: Business Beyond the Usual” (ESPO Policy Brief 8. 
FRIDE, Madrid, Spain, 2013), 1–6.  
39 Ibid.  
40 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” 179. 
41 Bernardo Sorj and Sergio Fausto, “Brazil and South America: Contrasting Perspectives,” 
Plataforma Democrática (July 2011), 1–3. 
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power and autonomy on the path toward global power status.42 They also argue that Brazil 
“should not give up on the aspiration of regional integration forged on solid common 
institutional foundations.”43 This goal provides a regional narrative that South American 
leaders can use to coordinate their efforts and prevent losses in areas in which integration 
has already progressed. The gap in Sorj and Fausto’s work is that they see Brazil as neither 
a global or regional power but more of a state competing for each of these levels vis-à-vis 
regional integration.  
Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz’s work on Brazil’s role as an emerging 
superpower offers another alternative to the status of its level of power. More specifically, 
they argue that “if by ‘economic superpower’ we mean a country that can exert significant 
influence in the global economy—one that is a significant force as a rule maker, not just a 
rule taker—then Brazil is already well on its way.”44 Brainard and Martinez-Diaz support 
their argument with Brazil’s market power and role in the energy markets. Their work 
outlines Brazil’s aspirations and limitations as a superpower based on a qualitative 
definition providing no quantitative measurement where this theoretical research will 
expand upon.   
Further research on Brazil’s political ambitions and dilemmas (limitations) is 
available in Hal Brands’ study on “Brazilian Grand Strategy.”45 According to Brands, 
“grand strategy is the relation of means to ends, the process by which nations harness and 
allocate resources in the service of their international objectives.”46 The four dilemmas he 
proposes for Brazil that all limit Brazil’s potential for global power status, include: internal, 
regional, international, and relations with the U.S. Brand’s overall assessment in 2010 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 3. Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, Brazil as an Economic Superpower? 
Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the Global Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2009), Kindle edition, Loc. 161–163; Brainard and Martinez-Diaz also refer to this strategy as global 
insertion with regional integration as a means to achieve global power, which is one of Brazil’s ambitions 
vis-à-vis regional trade.  
43 Sorj and Fausto, “Brazil and South America: Contrasting Perspectives,” 14. 
44 Brainard and Martinez-Diaz, Brazil as an Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil's 
Changing Role in the Global Economy, Kindle edition, Loc. 161–163. 
45 Hal Brands, Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, 2010).  
46 Ibid., 60. 
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mimics that of two separate articles in The Economist that coin Brazil as an emerging 
power with potential with many internal socioeconomic issues; however, the three studies 
fail to define or rank Brazil as a global power.47   
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The method for this study is to consolidate and simplify a theoretical framework to 
identify whether Brazil has achieved global power status. Brazil has historically desired 
global power status and a recent example of this aspiration is from President Lula in 2003 
and Defense Minister Nelson Jobim in 2009.48  
President Lula has announced that Brazil will become a great power in this 
century, and Brazilian official discourse is infused with a sense of national 
strength and purpose. Brazil must think big, said Defense Minister Nelson 
Jobim in 2009. This is the moment in which it’s necessary to be audacious 
in order to advance. . . . There is no longer any possibility of asking Brazil, 
on the international stage, to take positions that run contrary to its 
interests.49    
The framework for this research is divided into three chapters to analyze the overall 
power status of Brazil. Chapter I will critically assess neoliberal reform and the political 
economy in Brazil. The first section will analyze the economic capacity of Brazil from its 
democratic transition to the present day. This analysis will explore the major resources, 
trade policies, and relevant domestic policies that have enabled Brazil to achieve the 
seventh largest economy in the world. In doing so, an analysis of Brazil’s major trading 
partners will be made to determine Brazil’s credibility in the global arena. The final section 
of this chapter will build the foundation of the economic power, and it will provide Brazil’s 
limitations in achieving global power status. Income distribution, education, and 
infrastructure are a few of the areas that will be explored to understand what challenges or 
                                                 
47 Helen Joyce, “Grounded: Special Report Brazil,” The Economist, September 28, 2013, 1–16; “Has 
Brazil Blown it?” The Economist, September 28, 2013. 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21586833-stagnant-economy-bloated-state-and-mass-protests-
mean-dilma-rousseff-must-change-course-has.  
48 Brands, “Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy,” 2. Brand quotes Lula and Jobim from: “Brazil 
Must Think Big, Says Jobim,” Latin American Regional Report: Brazil & Southern Cone, July 2009; “Lula 
Launches Preparations for Superpower Status,” Latin American Security & Strategic Review, September 
2007, 2. 
49 Ibid.  
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achievements Brazil has experienced over the last 20 years. Empirical data from the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation (OECD,) the World Bank, the UN, and the IMF 
will provide sufficient information to compare Brazil to the members of the BRIC nations, 
Latin America (LATAM), and other global powers.   
Chapter II will be divided into three sections. The first section will provide an 
analysis of the military capabilities of Brazil, utilizing data from Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). 
This analysis will quantify Brazil’s personnel, assets, and military expenditure. The second 
section will provide a comparative analysis of the BRIC members to determine the status of 
Brazil in relation to the other emerging powers.   
Chapter III will turn to Brazil’s most influential area of expertise with soft power 
diplomacy in trade and economics. An analysis of its role in IOs, the United Nations (UN), 
and cultural impact outside of Latin America, are a few areas that will build on the 
importance of Brazil in the international community as a potential global power. Literature 
on Brazil’s status and limitations includes Hal Brands’ assessment of economic success and 
dilemmas and Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz’s book on Brazil’s role in the 
global economy.50 International influence will be measured from statistics from the IMF 
and World Bank, and analyses from Ana Alves, Elena Lazarou, and Christina Stolte on 
Brazilian trade relations.51 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I will provide a brief background of Brazil and its economic achievements 
vis-à-vis neoliberal reform policies. The importance of the success in Brazilian economics 
leads into the question of where Brazil stands in relations to global powers in the world, 
and what its role should be. For the purpose of this research, the comparative analysis will 
encompass population size, resources, technology, and challenges to Brazil’s status as a 
                                                 
50 Ibid; Brainard and Martinez-Diaz, Brazil as an Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil's 
Changing Role in the Global Economy. 
51 Ana C. Alves, “Chinese Resource Quest in Brazil: The Changing Role of Economic Statecraft,” 
Portuguese Journal of International Affairs 6 (2012); Lazarou, The Sixth EU-Brazil Summit: Business 
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Chatham House Briefing Paper (2012). 
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global power. This chapter will lay the foundation of Brazil’s wealth, based on internal 
resources including oil, natural gas, and energy. The second section will focus on the 
domestic economic reform policies that have accelerated the economy in Brazil. This 
research will explore Bolsa Família, the Real Plan, the Growth Acceleration Program of 
Investment, Export Oriented Growth, and BRIC status as a few of the reform attempts to 
fix the socioeconomic issues and build wealth in Brazil past the status of an emerging 
country 
Chapter II will describe the military capabilities of Brazil and provide a 
comparative analysis in relation to Latin America and the BRIC nations. In doing so, this 
chapter will explore the areas that matter most for hard power including military spending, 
size of force, and technology of its forces. Measuring military power will incorporate a 
state’s internal resources, military strength, and energy consumption as factors that are 
easily transferred into hard power capabilities. Additionally, a comparison will be made to 
each of the military capabilities with the leading militaries of LATAM, BRIC, and current 
global powers.   
Chapter III will focus on soft power diplomacy and international influence 
measured through trade, role in IOs, alliances, and the UN because these are indicators of 
exerting political and economic influence beyond the state and region. This chapter will 
further explore Brazil’s international influence through trade partnerships, and cultural 
impact outside of the Latin American region. This research will explore trade with Africa, 
China, and the EU as an alternative to East-West cooperation and a more South-South 
approach to counter the power of U.S. hegemony. Furthermore, trade among the emerging 
blocs and Brazil’s role will describe Brazil’s level of regional and global influence. This 
chapter will also explore Brazil’s role in other international organizations, and how Brazil 
progressed from receiving IMF loans to becoming a loan guarantor. How this happened 
and how much influence Brazil has in the IMF will be two of the major questions 
answered. The final section of this chapter will look at Brazil’s regional influence through 
its position in the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR), and the UN.   
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The primary focus throughout each chapter is Brazil’s achievements, aspirations, 
limitations, and international influence during the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) and 
Dilma Rousseff administrations. Chapter IV will summarize Brazil’s accomplishments and 
determine whether Brazil is a global power according to the framework established. Further 
suggestions can then be made as to whether Brazil deserves greater scrutiny in the 
international community as a global player. This research can then determine whether it is 
necessary for increased U.S.-Brazil relations or if the status quo should remain. 
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II. BRAZILIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  
A. NEOLIBERAL REFORM IN BRAZIL 
This chapter determines the extent to which domestic economic and political factors 
shape and influence the role of Brazil in world affairs, and how these dynamics contribute 
to neoliberal reform in Brazil. The analysis addresses gradual market reform and shock 
therapy as the two most popular paths to economic growth that Brazil attempted during 
military rule (1964−1985), transition to democracy (1985−1995), and consolidation of 
democracy (1995−present). First, this chapter will argue that economic crisis and an 
ideational approach (learning from previous mistakes) are the primary contributing factors 
to neo-liberal reform and the economic success of the Brazilian economy. Subsequently, 
this economic success provides the foundation for the argument for Brazil’s global power 
status. Furthermore, the economic success of Brazil enables it to extend diplomatic 
influence through trade. Overall, neoliberal reform opened Brazil to international markets; 
trade translates to power in the global arena. Finally, the emergence of Brazil as a 
competitive global economy contributes to a shift in the international balance of power 
from a bipolar/unipolar to a multipolar system.  
1. Existing Neoliberal Reform Theories 
The first section of this chapter provides a summary of theories explaining why 
countries institute neo-liberal reform policies—specifically, economic crisis theory; 
political institutional theory; ideational theory; rational choice, and finally cognitive-
psychological theory. These theories provide the justification for the application of what is 
termed orthodox or heterodox economic solutions. The orthodox approach refers to the 
more gradual and long-term stabilization programs. Heterodox reform policies will be used 
in terms of the shock therapy approaches, which are radical, quick fixes to economic 
problems. 
The heterodox and orthodox approaches are about state intervention, which relates 
to how the domestic market is regulated. To institute neoliberal reform, the stabilization 
programs (Cruzado Plan 1986, Collor Plan 1990−1992, and Plano Real 1994−present) 
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needed to occur first to combat debt and inflation issues. Once those issues were corrected, 
the neoliberal reform involving deregulation, openness to trade, and privatization could 
occur. The major theme from 1990 and into the 2000s in Brazil was the legislative 
initiative geared toward price indexation, where the government regulated prices and 
wages. The shock programs (heterodox) froze these parts of the market immediately, which 
involved high levels of state interventionism. The gradual program (orthodox) or Real Plan 
(Plano Real), introduced a new currency backed by the U.S. dollar but did not have an 
immediate effect. Instead of freezing prices and wages, Plano Real gradually changed 
prices and wages to keep the market profitable. This was still state interventionism, but on 
a more gradual level to help the market function. Both approaches (orthodox and 
heterodox) are a form domestic market manipulation that attempted to combat the issues of 
major debt and hyperinflation.52   
While Brazil has shifted between shock therapy and gradual-market reform, both 
involve some sort of state intervention, as the Brazilian government likes to shape or 
control the market based on which stabilization program is implemented. This ability to 
create wealth through reform is what leads to the discussion of increased trade partnerships 
and reinvestment to fix the socioeconomic issues of poverty, inflation, and debt. 
The second section will analyze contributing factors to Brazil’s economic reform 
during military rule (1964−1985). The third section will assess neo-liberal reform during 
the transition to democracy (1985−1995). Similarly, the fourth section will analyze the neo-
liberal reform during the consolidation of democracy (1995−present), and how reform 
reinforces democratic principles. The subsequent section will assess the extent to which 
Brazil’s neo-liberal reform policies have shaped its domestic agenda and influence through 
trade. This section will also analyze how these reforms increased the economic power of 
Brazil, which contributes to increased international influence vis-à-vis trade relations and a 
shift in the balance of power. The final section will assess the economic limitations to 
Brazil’s global power status.   
                                                 
52 Kurt Weyland, The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and 
Venezuela (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 3–39. 
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a. Economic Crises Theory 
Kurt Weyland presents four theoretical arguments to explain the contributing 
factors of neoliberal reform policies in Latin America. Weyland also argues that a crisis is 
central to triggering economic reform.53 The first theory is the economic crisis argument 
that centers on economic crises and external influences. More specifically, “economic 
arguments emphasize that severe economic problems resulting from external dependency 
and strong pressures from international financial institutions forces Latin American 
governments to adopt orthodox (gradual) adjustments.”54  
When Brazil’s foreign debt doubled to 43 billion from 1975−1978,55 Brasilia 
applied an orthodox solution under military rule, which pursued foreign direct investment 
or loans through aid from the World Bank and the IMF. Prescriptions were also made to 
reduce tariffs and other trade barriers, and introduce other neoliberal reforms. However, as 
Albert Fishlow points out, this failed largely because the government failed to curb 
inflation and encountered rising debt problems. After applying the IMF prescribed plans, 
Brazil turned toward a more heterodox approach in the mid-1980s.56 President José Sarney 
enacted the Cruzado Plan in 1986 that immediately froze price and exchange rates, leading 
to a temporary elimination of inflation. This stabilization plan was intended to counter the 
immediate economic crises and open Brazilian trade to produce increased growth. Within a 
year, the Sarney administration raised taxes, exchange rates began to vary, and indexation 
returned that led to the re-emergence of inflation and the government’s inability to meet its 
financial obligations.57 Indexing is the process of adjusting prices and wages, which would 
potentially slow or eliminate the rising inflation rates. During the period of indexing, 
expanding credit and foreign loans led to the rising debt, and the foreign trade expansion 
perpetuated the economic boom and bust cycle. The economic crises theory shows that 
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54 Ibid. 
55 Boris Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 301.  
56 Albert Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 
2011), 34–35.  
57 Ibid., 38.  
 20 
governments act with measures that might be neo-liberal or orthodox, or a combination of 
both; however, this theory alone does not consider previous market reform failures. The 
ideational theory helps to fill this gap. 
b. Political Institutional Theory 
Weyland’s second theory is from a political institutional perspective. The political 
institutional theory argues “that the successful enactment of neoliberal reform depended on 
the institutional powers of chief executives and the support provided by strong political 
parties.”58 This theoretical argument does not explain Brazil’s market strategy under 
military rule, because of the absence of political parties. Weyland also argues that Brazil’s 
neoliberal reform under presidents Collor (1990–1992) and Cardoso (1995–2002) had a 
difficult time gaining congressional support despite having strongly defined legislative 
powers for presidents.59 In short, the political institutional argument is insufficient to 
explain why neoliberal reform was enacted.  
c. Ideational Theory 
The third theory is an ideational argument. Weyland explains that “ideational 
accounts stress that political elites and citizens learned from the economic failure of state 
interventionism and therefore embraced neoliberal ideas.”60 The ideational argument 
partially explains the shift from heterodox to orthodox reform policies; however, the 
dynamism of the Brazilian economy has created vast economic growth followed by severe 
crisis regardless of the approach. The ideational argument assumes that the political elites 
actually learned from previous failures.61 Over the last few decades, Brazil implemented 
the Cruzado Plan, the Collor Plans, and the Real Plan, all of which imposed high levels of 
state interventionism. The Cruzado Plan was a heterodox shock program that tried an 
alternative to the orthodox reforms under military rule. The Collor Plans were also 
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59 Ibid., 23–24.  
60 Ibid., 3–4.  
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heterodox shock programs. These legislative reforms happened after the failure of a 
previous shock program under the Cruzado Plan, and the ideational theory does not explain 
the propensity to use another shock program. The Real Plan fits the mold of the orthodox 
reform, as it gradually adjusted the price mechanism in the market instead of freezing 
prices, wages, and taxes. The Real Plan learned from the mistakes of the Collor Plans and 
made the applicable adjustments to lower the level of state interventionism.62 This allowed 
the market to rule with government assistance rather than complete control.  
d. Rational Choice  
The fourth theoretical argument concerns rational choice. Weyland points out that 
“rational choice arguments claim that given severe economic crises, politicians rationally 
chose drastic shock programs over gradual market reform in order to minimize the political 
costs of structural adjustment and to reap political benefits by using neoliberal measures to 
weaken their adversaries.”63 This argument does not explain the two shock therapy plans of 
the Collor administration because there was no other choice available. Brazil was coping 
with hyperinflation (approximately 80 percent in 1990) and a monetary issue.64 With an 
immediate economic crisis, the administration needed a quick fix and did not have the time 
for a gradual long-term stabilization plan. As Fishlow states, “The Collor failure shows that 
shock treatment, even with a major fiscal effort, is insufficient to produce an end to 
inflation when it is accompanied by erratic monetary policy, a fluctuating exchange rate, 
and a labor market in disequilibrium.”65 The rational choice theory also does not explain 
why Brazil chose neoliberal reform policies under military rule. Under military rule, the 
regime did not have an adversary, and reform was based on increasing its own wealth. The 
rational choice theory does explain neoliberalism under the Real Plan. Under this plan, the 
government tweaked the previous Collor Plan to minimize the structural costs. The Real 
Plan had initial failures, but the choice for this program was to combat inflation with a 
gradual program based on the previous administration.  
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e. Cognitive-Psychological Theory 
The fifth theoretical argument on neo-liberal reform fills the gap of the previous 
theories. As Weyland argues, “cognitive-psychological argument suggests that severe 
economic crises induced political leaders to initiate—and common people to support—
neoliberal shock programs despite their tremendous economic and political risks and 
despite the feasibility of more prudent, less painful adjustment policies.”66 According to 
Weyland, the most useful cognitive-psychological argument is the prospect theory.67 This 
theoretical approach explains the propensity to take risks in political decisions based on 
gains and losses. The propensity to take risks is important in determining why and which 
neoliberal reform policies are enacted. In short, a heterodox shock therapy approach is 
more risky than the more gradual orthodox approach. With these theories on the 
calculations for implementing neo-liberal reform, subsequent sections will further analyze 
Brazil during three time periods to identify the causal factors of neo-liberal reform policies. 
More specifically, the following section will show how neoliberal reform in Brazil follows 
economic crises and an ideational approach  
B. CAUSES OF NEOLIBERAL REFORM 
The military regime in Brazil (1964−1985) came into power during the ISI phase 
and followed an orthodox approach to neoliberal reform. Import substitution 
industrialization took place across Latin America from 1930−1970 enabling Brazil, in 
1974, to replace coffee with manufactured goods as the primary export commodity. The 
regime previously utilized ISI and privatization to expand the economy and produce 
economic growth. ISI reached its plateau in Brazil in the early 1970s and ushered in the era 
of neo-liberal reform policies. In addition, the military controlled union wages as the 
economy grew annually at nearly 11 percent.68 The opening of trade and the shift to 
primary export commodities resulted in vast economic growth. Joseph Page notes that “by 
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1973, the country was exporting $10 billion worth of goods, up from less than $3 billion in 
1968.”69 The previously mentioned economic growth, known as the Brazilian Miracle, was 
due to the control measures that minimized inflation through indexing, expanding credit, 
foreign funds, and foreign trade expansion. Indexing was the primary source of controlling 
the price mechanism in Brazil.  
The military regime also adopted the economic policy of rent-seeking and 
indexation.70 The regime focused spending on increasing strength rather than creating or 
improving overall wealth that benefited its citizens. Thomas Wright argues that the purpose 
of this type of regime was threefold: Make Brazil immune to revolution, promote economic 
development, and purge country of political radicals (root out all ideas of Marxism).71 To 
achieve each of these goals, the military regime needed to shape the economy to produce 
wealth and focus spending efforts on security. An example is how the regime launched 
major infrastructure projects with economic gains during the mid-1970s, and eliminated the 
threat of revolution. With the quadrupling of oil prices for a leading importer of oil during 
the major oil crises, the regime chose rent-seeking and indexation to meet financial 
obligations.72 The major problem is that indexation manipulated the current economy 
instead of creating new wealth by changing the prices and wages. Rent-seeking 
complicated the problem because the wealth generated was used to enhance the wealth and 
power of the military regime. As Page points out, the military regime in late 1970s created 
recession, increased inflation, and deepened the deficit.73 Marcos de Barros Lisboa also 
states, “The government’s decision to cope with inflation was to strengthen the indexation 
mechanism of promoting fiscal consolidation,”74 which flexed the strength of the regime. 
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This approach also created subsequent problems in economic and political stability because 
of further indexing of prices and wages.   
Indexing’s high inflation rates also created an unanticipated and unstable 
macroeconomic environment that inevitably made Brazil more susceptible to exogenous 
shocks; an example is the case with the Middle Eastern oil crisis in 1973.75 With the onset 
of the oil crises, Brazil’s external debt was approximately 43 billion USD. As Thomas 
Skidmore et al. notes, “Brazil had few oil reserves, and the sharp hike in petroleum prices 
in 1974 forced the government to pay significantly higher prices for imports, which fueled 
inflation.”76 To curb the inflation that surpassed 100 percent in 1980, Brazil started to 
accumulate even more foreign debt. 
To keep current on debt, the military regime relied on exports. This stance was 
because the easy phase of ISI was over. ISI inevitably created economic stagnation across 
Latin America, and world recession set in that caused a severe devaluation of Brazilian 
exports. ISI restricted economic growth to the limits of its domestic economy because of 
tariffs, barriers, and protectionist market strategy. To achieve economic growth, the regime 
had to lift these restrictions and shift to an export oriented economy. This shift enabled 
significant growth, but made it susceptible to exogenous shocks from the global economy.   
The fast decline in the commodities market plunged the region into an economic 
crisis for most of the 1980s, which led to Brazil being unable to meet its financial 
obligations in late 1982.77 Loans from the IMF, World Bank, and U.S. Treasury with 
strings attached became the norm under the Washington Consensus. For example, the IMF 
prescribed loans were provided after the government reduced military spending, lifted 
tariffs on imports, and liberalized flow of trade. As Skidmore et al. describes the 
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus: “first, Latin American governments should 
support the private sector; Second, they should liberalize policies on trade; and Third, 
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perhaps most important, they should reduce the economic role of the state (in particular, 
they should privatize state owned industries).”78 
These rescue loans allowed for economic growth in the industrial sector, and started 
the era of neoliberal reform policies. By 1985, the country produced nearly 80 percent of its 
needs for capital goods domestically. This ability to manufacture goods once imported 
allowed Brazil to become a major competitor with the global economy instead of a banana 
republic. Following the orthodox principles set forth by international forces, Brazil 
continued to see rising prices and inflation.   
By 1984, Brazil’s external debt nearly doubled to 91 billion USD. The military 
regime’s centralization of power allowed for the transition of political power to civilian 
rule, which subsequently inherited this extreme debt and inflation problem. As Weyland 
argues, “to implement neoliberal reform involves the forceful dismantling of the 
established development model, and may therefore require a significant concentration of 
political power.”79 The military regime in this regard allowed for the implementation of 
neoliberal reforms in an orthodox manner, which led to a more heterodox approach under 
civilian rule. In summary, neoliberal reform was attempted under military rule because ISI 
had reached its full potential, and the need for excess trade surplus from exports was 
necessary to curb inflation and rising debt. The IMF loans foreshadowed neo-liberal 
reform, and these economic reforms failed under the military regime—leading to a need for 
dramatic political change. 
1. Neoliberal Reform during the Transition to Democracy 
When the regime changed to civilian rule, José Sarney was the first president under 
the era of neo-liberal reform policies during the transition to democracy. With the 
economic crises created during the military regime, Sarney’s economic policy fits the mold 
for three of the previously mentioned theories on neoliberal reform. First, the ideational 
argument assumes that civilian led governments learn from previous failures. As Weyland 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 369–370. 
79 Weyland, The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and 
Venezuela, 136.  
 26 
argues, Brazil’s neo-liberal reform was “to cover up the problems of the decaying 
petroleum rentier model through intensified government interventionism.”80 Weyland is 
referring to Sarney’s understanding of the military regimes economic failure vis-à-vis rent-
seeking and following prescribed rules the IMF set. Consequently, the need for government 
interventionism through neo-liberal reform was based on the military regime’s previous 
failures. 
Second, the rational choice argument explains the decision to institute shock 
therapy versus gradual market reform to maintain political support. Sarney inherited a 
strong executive branch from the military regime, and he used medida provisórias 
(provisional measures or MPs) to enact his economic and administrative measures without 
the approval of the National Congress.81 As Fishlow argues, the provisional measures were 
a unilateral means for the president “to reward supporters with governmental positions, 
allocate revenues to allied states and municipalities, and reward allies in myriad other 
ways.”82 The provisional measures strengthened the executive powers and allowed the 
Sarney administration to gain popularity because it was an alternative to the military 
regime’s economic policy.  
The main task of the Sarney administration was to end inflation.83 As inflation 
reached 80 percent in the beginning of 1990, there was only one heterodox alternative left. 
This heterodox approach was based upon the application of fiscal and monetary measures 
to eliminate excess demand.84 There were two ways to proceed. One way was the “Larida” 
proposal, which consisted of a temporary dual currency, with a varying exchange rate 
between the new money and the old. The Sarney government decided to adopt an 
alternative Cruzado Plan, implemented in February of 1986, which created an immediate 
price and exchange rate freeze. Sarney’s administration significantly decreased inflation 
with the Cruzado, but this was only temporary.  
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After the government of Sarney raised taxes, inflation had quickly reemerged with 
even greater force. The government could no longer meet its obligations to private 
creditors, and official reserves had been exhausted. Brazil was at the mercy of economic 
crises. By 1990, inflation, debt, and the ability to meet financial obligations, soon became 
the inherited problem of President Fernando Collor. His administration enacted the Collor 
Plan, which froze prices, wages, and allowed the exchange rate to fluctuate.85 This is an 
example of moving away from neoliberal reform because of an economic crisis. 
Government revenues increased dramatically; however, businesses wanted reduction of the 
high interest rate. Labor sought to restore indexation to ensure against real wage loss, and 
the Collor Plan ultimately failed as another round of shock therapy. The Collor Plan also 
counters the ideational argument because it failed to learn from the mistakes during the 
Cruzado Plan. In summary, the Cruzado and Collor Plans attempted shock therapy to create 
immediate public support, which went against an alternative orthodox approach with 
gradual market reform.86 
Third, the prospect theory argues that the decision to implement neo-liberal reform 
is based on gains and losses. The Sarney and Collor administrations favored a risky 
economic policy because the gains outweighed the losses. Both administrations inherited 
issues with debt, inflation, and currency instability from the previous executive 
administration. These economic issues and crises were the fault of their predecessors, thus 
enabling Sarney and Collor to implement a more bold-risky heterodox reform policy. Both 
sought drastic shock programs as Weyland notes, “as the savior who could turn the nation 
around.”87 In other words, the gain is the major political support, reelection and infamy 
after being credited with solving Brazil’s major economic problems. In contrast, the loss 
for both administrations was diminished political support, trust in the banking system, and 
infringement of rights. 
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For Collor, the political and economic risks were much higher because he lacked 
political support, and his two shock programs failed to stabilize the economy.88 
Additionally, these issues led to the impeachment of Collor in 1992 on charges of 
corruption. As Weyland argues, President Collor failed politically, but he initiated trade 
liberalization and pushed for privatization to put Brazil in the direction of market reform.89 
Collor was not completely successful at liberalization or privatization due to political 
obstacles, where the subsequent policies during the consolidation of democracy would. In 
summary, the contributing factors for Collor’s economic reform were the inheritance of 
economic crises, pressure from international organizations to meet its financial obligations, 
and domestic socio-economic factors of inflation and income distribution. 
2. Neoliberal Reform during the Consolidation of Democracy 
President Collor took initial risks with shock therapy and shifted to a more orthodox 
approach after the failure of Collor II. He appointed a new finance minister, Marcilío 
Marques Moreira, and a team of new ministers to commit the government to monetary and 
fiscal discipline. With the impeachment of President Collor on corruption charges, a 
succession of finance ministers averaged less than two months in office, which created a 
period of political disarray.   
It was not until the administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1995−2002) that the economic and political situation began to stabilize. To combat 
inflation, his administration gradually opened the Brazilian economy to trade and 
investment. Cardoso’s plan proved to be successful; according to Peter Meyer, “prices 
immediately began to stabilize, with annual inflation falling from 2,730 percent in 1993 to 
about 18 percent in 1995.”90 Subsequently, Cardoso is credited with establishing the 
foundation for macroeconomic stability in Brazil.  
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The economic, rational choice and ideational theories, explain the contributing 
factors to Cardoso’s Plano Real. Cardoso was appointed as the finance minister after the 
impeachment of Collor and Itamar Franco’s appointment as President. This administration 
inherited the economic crisis that was created after the failure of three major shock therapy 
styles of neo-liberal reform: the Cruzado Plan, Collor I, and Collor II. As Weyland argues, 
Collor’s political failure and shift toward a more orthodox approach took on the burden of 
costs for the beginning stages of a long-term stabilization program.91 Because of this, 
Cardoso was able to enjoy the political and economic benefits of a drastically different 
reform policy.  
The vastly different neoliberal reform policies during the aforementioned 
administrations enabled the Brazilian economy to grow exponentially from investing in the 
domestic domain and openness to increased trade. Introduced in July of 1994, Plano Real 
tweaked the principles of previous economic reform policies. As Fishlow points out, Plano 
Real did not freeze prices or wages, and indexation was still present.92 Additionally, 
imports significantly increased between 1993−1995 due to a decrease in tariffs in the early 
1990s under Collor. This trade increase allowed for the stabilization of tariffs and control 
over domestic prices. Furthermore, the creation of MERCOSUR in 1991, Brazil’s trade 
liberalization, and privatization of markets allowed for accelerated growth in the late 1990s 
and into the 2000s. Fishlow argues that the selling of state-owned enterprises emerged due 
to pressure from Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), 
which allowed it to invest into steel, fertilizer, and other strategic sectors.93 Privatization 
then became a means for the government to invest in the private sectors—creating further 
problems with inflation.  
With the long-term stabilization program under way, economic crises triggered 
Cardoso’s second reform policy. These economic crises were the Mexican devaluation in 
1994 and the Argentine collapse starting in 1998. Cardoso’s economic plans laid the 
                                                 
91 Weyland, The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and 
Venezuela, 56. 
92 Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985, 43–44. 
93 Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985, 51.  
 30 
foundation for economic growth that Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) would follow, but 
not before economic recession occurred in 1999. Fishlow notes, this plan was to shift to a 
floating currency to preserve diminishing reserves.94 This plan enabled the exchange rate to 
stabilize and Brazil’s economy to continue to grow.  
With recent global recession in the last decade, Brazil saw a mere 0.3 percent loss 
in 2009 while rebounding to a 10.0 percent growth in 2010.95 Furthermore, the Brazilian 
economy saw a 2.9 percent growth in 2011 while stagnating just below one percent in 
2012.96 Because of this economic growth, Brazil has enjoyed the ability to invest in 
infrastructure, military, and socio-economic programs to improve the quality of life for 
Brazilians. The overall success of neoliberal reform in the 1990s vis-à-vis Plano Real 
created the economic stabilization that Brazil enjoys today. The stagnation of the economy 
in 2012 is due to Brazil’s investments in pensions, rising commodity prices, and the payoff 
from continual runaway inflation.97   
The central theme to stimulate neo-liberal reform policies during the consolidation 
to democracy is economic crises. Drastic shock therapy programs in Brazil proved initially 
successful, but they created greater economic instability. Based on previous failures under 
orthodox policies, inheritance of economic crises, and internal pressures for political 
support led to heterodox shock programs.98 An example of gradual economic reform is 
Plano Real (1994), which was based on the failure of three previous shock programs. The 
previous shock programs failed, but they created the initial economic stabilization, 
liberalization, and privatization efforts that enabled the orthodox reform policies to be 
successful. BNDES provided the initial internal pressure for privatization, and international 
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pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the South American Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) led to liberalization in trade to produce a surplus. This surplus 
translates into Brazil’s ability to invest and combat its socioeconomic issues.   
Major causal factors to the social unrest over the last few years are poor 
infrastructure and poverty, which are Brazil’s major socioeconomic issues. The Growth 
Acceleration Program of Investment is a multitude of infrastructure projects aimed at 
improving roads, railways, and other public works.99 The awarding of the 2014 World Cup 
and 2016 Olympics are two of the major ongoing infrastructure projects. These particular 
events include major improvements to public transportation, security, and infrastructure for 
the games. These projects also are a major source of social unrest, as noted by the 
Economist, due to Brazil allocating a mere 1.7 percent of GDP to infrastructure 
improvements compared to 71 percent from other major economic powers.100 The major 
issue of contention is that the tax burden, approx. 35 percent, shared by the public 
continues to increase while the infrastructure and public works fail to improve the quality 
of life at an acceptable rate for the individual citizen. 
In regard to other socioeconomic issues, Brazil is reducing poverty and inequality. 
Bolsa Família was a major social works program aimed at diminishing inequality under 
Lula. Bolsa Família provided family grants, which were monthly cash transfers for 48 
million people.101 In exchange for these grants, families ensured that their children would 
attend school on a normal basis and receive proper medical care. Later in his 
administration, Lula established new program like Minha Casa and Minha Vida, which 
helped to provide formal housing to low-income Brazilians. These programs have 
decreased poverty and increased overall school enrollment. According to the 2013 Human 
Development Index report, Brazil decreased the number of people who are considered 
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income poor from 17.2 percent of the total population in 1990 to 6.1 percent in 2009.102 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report on 
Brazilian education shows a “41 percent upper secondary attainment rate for 25–64 year-
olds is below the G20 average of 56 percent and far below the OECD average of 74 
percent.”103 The decline in income disparity, increase in school enrollment, and vast 
economic growth over the last decade has Brazil improving its socioeconomic issues 
alongside the BRIC countries, but shows that it has various inhibiting factors to its 
emergence as a global power.  
Brazil’s role as a BRIC commonly places it among the leading and emerging world 
powers. Brands points out that “President Lula and Minister Amorim have stated on 
numerous occasions that they view BRIC as an emerging trade bloc that will eventually 
constitute an alternative to the Western-dominated system led by the United States and the 
EU.”104 As the weakest military power among BRIC members, Brazil has increased 
military spending $14 billion USD from 2003−2009; however, 75 percent of its spending is 
focused on personnel.105 Additional military capabilities to increase its power projection 
include helicopters, combat aircraft and military transports, and currently Saab has secured 
a contract worth $4.5 billion dollars to replace the aging jets of the Brazilian Air Force. 
Additional military capabilities will be further discussed in Chapter III.    
C. NEOLIBERAL REFORM AND TRADE PARTNERSHIPS 
Based on Brazil’s ability to institute neoliberal reform, it has become open to trade, 
which is one dimension of its power in the global arena. Currently, Brazil is the fifth most 
populous country in the world with 198 million citizens. At 2.2 trillion, Brazil’s GDP per 
capita ranks seventh largest in the world and first in Latin America. To diversify its market 
from reliance on foreign oil, Brazil has become the second largest producer of ethanol and 
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hydroelectric power, which comprises 85 percent of its energy demand.106 Lael Brainard 
and Leonardo Martinez point out that, “Brazil derives 46 percent of its energy from 
renewable sources, compared with a world average of 13 percent and an OECD average of 
just 6 percent.”107 According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Brazil’s five largest 
trading partners are the EU, China, the U.S., Argentina, and Japan, respectively. In regard 
to this list, Argentina is the only trading partner that holds Brazil in its top five. This 
statistic represents the balance of power vis-à-vis trade partnerships, and how the Brazilian 
market has yet to reach the economic potential of a global power.  
Since 2012, Brazil has also contributed over 20 million USD to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) as a creditor. Julia Sweig argues a major change for Brazil is that it 
borrowed 20 billion USD in 2003 from the IMF and paid this loan back in 2005.108 After 
paying this loan back, Brazil has shifted from receiving IMF loans to a guarantor of loans. 
The recent shift of the G-8 to the G-20 also shows that the global scale of power is shifting; 
however, the next chapter will assess the hard military capabilities of Brazil in terms of 
military strength.  
1. Brazilian Trade with China 
Because of Brazil’s focus on neo-liberal reform, from 2000−2011 overall Brazilian 
international trade and influence has increased dramatically. This openness to trade is what 
set the stage for success of the Brazilian economy. According to the WTO, “bilateral trade 
between Brazil and China grew from $2 billion in 2000 to $77 billion in 2011, which made 
it Brazil’s second largest trading partner in 2009 at 16 percent of its overall trade.109 
Brands also notes that trade during this same time frame expanded 12 fold, and the recent 
discovery of pre-salt oil reserves will continue to improve the economic integration of the 
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Brazilian and Chinese economies.110 The composition of trade from Brazil is primarily 
soya, iron ore, and oil—Brazil’s largest resources.111 Brazil in terms of trade is following 
Adam Smith’s absolute cost advantage model, which states that a country should specialize 
in, and export, commodities in which it had an absolute advantage.112 From the Chinese 
perspective, Brazil only accounts for 2 percent of imports and 1.5 percent of exports. 
Therefore, China would barely notice if Brazil stopped trading, but the Brazilian economy 
would suffer dramatically from the inability to export its raw materials to its top consumer. 
Another major problem with transporting raw materials to Asia is the cost in shipping. Lael 
Brainard argues that ocean shipping between 2001−2006 for iron ore was more expensive 
that the actual cargo.113  
Trade offers both opportunities and limitations for Brazil’s international aspirations. 
With a growing economy and a middle class with increase purchasing power, Brazil is a 
favorable market for exporter of manufactures and importers of natural resources. In the 
global environment, trade between the U.S., Brazil, and China is a major component of 
their economic and diplomatic relationship. The sudden Chinese escalation in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Latin America after 2004 put Brazil in good position. China climbed to 
the third lender in FDI in Latin America, behind the U.S. and the Netherlands This trend in 
investment highlights the diversification and commodity price stability. The global 
economic rise of China and its demand for raw materials has benefited natural resource 
sector. On the other hand, it has affected economies reliant upon labor-intensive and low 
skilled labor manufactures corresponding to textiles and manufactures.114 China’s 
increasing economic and diplomatic presence in Brazil is both beneficial, and a direct 
challenge to the Brazilian manufacturing sector. In addition, while the United States has 
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lost ground in the Brazilian market to China, it remains an important partner to both Brazil 
and China. First, the economic data published by the WTO illustrates the dynamics of 
Brazil-China and Brazil-U.S. trade. Secondly, China is a cause for optimism and concern 
for the Brazilian economy.  
According to Alves, China and Brazil formed one of the most prosperous alliances 
in the developing world today. Despite diplomatic relations dating back to 1974, it was not 
until recently that bilateral trade increased between Brazil and China. In 2000, the 
percentage of Chinese exports to Brazil was very low—around $2 billion—but in 2011 it 
rose exponentially reaching $77 billion, equal to 16 percent of Brazil’s total trade.115 The 
new industrial policies favored the expansion of heavy industries for extraction of metals 
(mineral fuels, iron, and copper) and the urban growth in China has increased wages for 
urban workers, generating demand for consumption. These combinations explain the 
economic interests of China in Brazil.  
Trading with China is both an opportunity and a cost for Brazil. Where the 
economies are complementary, the results are positive, and where they compete, the 
outcomes are generally negative. The exports to China revolved around metals, oil, and 
agricultural products. Chinese exports products are mainly in manufactures, accounting for 
93 percent of Chinese world exports.116 China has brought the Dutch disease, where the 
new production of a natural resource results in the domestic decline in production of 
manufactured products. This decline can have devastating effects leading to rise in 
unemployment and the loss of better paying jobs for Brazilians.  
Brazil, with approximately half of the South American population, faces the 
greatest challenge of balancing China’s exports. Manufactures account for 33 percent of 
Brazil’s exports, but it also accounts for 72 percent of imports.117 Competing directly with 
China can lead to erosion of the manufacturing sector in the local economy and high 
unemployment. In order to protect against this outcome, Brazil has brought 101 
                                                 
115 Alves, Chinese Resource Quest in Brazil: The Changing Role of Economic Statecraft, 30.  




antidumping cases against trading partners since 1989, which 20 percent were against 
China.118  
China’s less restrictive lending practices are a great incentive for Brazil. In fact, 
Alves points out that there were few investors interested in lending during the economic 
crisis of 2009–2011. China’s “infrastructure-for-resources” is a win-win situation for Brazil 
with major infrastructure needs and extraction deficiency. The $10 billion dollars loan 
provides insight into China’s ability to adapt to the Brazilian requirements of local 
equipment purchases and of hiring Brazilian workers. In the end, the Chinese received 
concessions for oil and no-bid contracts, and the Brazilians acquired loans for their 
newfound pre-salt reserves.119 
2. Brazil-U.S. Trade 
Despite ranking third in both imports and exports to Brazil, the Brazil-United States 
trade relationship is not without contention. According to Peter J. Meyer, the United States 
and Brazil have some long-running disputes. Among them, are the stalled Doha trade 
negotiations, and Brazilian opposition to U.S. cotton subsidies.120 In 2001, Brazil led the 
G-20 group of developing countries during the Doha Round of the World Trade 
Organization to demand that developed countries reduce and eventually eliminate 
agricultural subsidies as part of any agreement. In 2005, Brazil also led opposition along 
with several other South American countries to effectively put an end to the U.S.-backed 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 
Considering the differences over subsidies and the lack of a free trade agreement, 
U.S.-Brazil trade has exponentially increased in the last 15 years. Peter Meyer points out 
“between 2003 and 2012, U.S.-Brazil trade increased 161 percent to $75.8 billion.”121 
Additionally, “U.S. goods exports to Brazil increased 283 percent to $43.7 billion and U.S. 
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goods imports from Brazil increased 75 percent to $32.1 billion.”122 Top U.S. exports to 
Brazil included heavy and electric machinery, oil, and civilian aircraft and parts. Top U.S. 
imports from Brazil included crude oil, iron and steel, machinery, ethanol, and coffee. 
Overall, the United States runs a trade surplus with Brazil. Because the U.S. imports 
machinery, Brazil prefers a trade deficit with the United States vis-à-vis China where it has 
a trade surplus. In the 1990s, Latin American exports started to show signs of sophistication 
with shares in medium to high tech exports increasing; yet the trend reversed to low-tech 
exports once China came in the picture. 
3. Brazil-Africa Trade 
Trade with Africa also increased from $4.2 billion to $27.6 billion with 42 percent 
of Brazilian exports consisted of manufactured goods.123 Subsequently, Africa offers Brazil 
diversification from exporting simple raw materials.124 According to Christina Stolte, trade 
with Africa is driven by foreign policy and not an economic benefit as a means of 
internationalization.125 In other words, Brazil is expanding in Africa to share its success as 
a developed economy because of similar economic characteristics to its history (i.e., 
poverty, inequality, inflation, and debt). Stolte points out that Lula turned the business 
elites toward Africa in an attempt to reduce dependency on the industrialized countries—a 
policy that Dilma Rousseff continued through her presidency.126 Consequently, Africa is a 
region where Brazil is attempting to influence based on similar geography, socio-economic, 
and political issues. Brazil in this sense seeks to use its development strategy to jump start 
cooperative food security and agricultural assistance programs throughout Africa. 
Brazil is also helping Africa in the struggle against HIV/AIDS through bilateral 
agreements on health and establishing national institutes of health. Ultimately, Brazil is 
building economic relations in a developing region of the world (Africa) as a means to 
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spread its diplomatic resources and influence based on its previous neo-liberal reform. 
Brazil has an absolute advantage in manufactured goods over Africa; however, Chinese 
manufacturing presents fierce competition throughout the continent.   
In terms of other competition, Peru, Colombia, Panama, Mexico, Nicaragua, and 
Chile maintain free-trade agreements (FTA) with the European Union (EU), which Brazil 
has failed to achieve due to protectionist economic policy on both sides.127 Brazil is also 
prohibited from negotiating a FTA with the EU because of its membership in the South 
American Common Market (Mercosur). An EU-Brazil FTA would have to be negotiated 
through Mercosur because requires approval from the other member states. 
4. Brazil-European Union Trade 
At 23 percent of total trade, the EU is Brazil’s largest trading partner.128 The 
following contribute to a less asymmetrical economic relationship: 
 Brazil as the EU’s fifth largest foreign investor 
 The EU as a recipient of IMF funds 
 Brazil’s shift to becoming a creditor to the IMF 
Elena Lazarou also argues that the inability to reach mutually beneficial trade 
agreements and an EU-U.S. FTA would further distance Brazil from the EU.129 In short, 
the global trading community appears to be shifting from bilateral to multilateral 
agreements through trade blocs. This means that Brazil needs to extend its influence and 
authority through Mercosur.  
According to Bernardo Sorj and Sergio Fausto, Brazil has an important role to play 
in South American integration vis-à-vis MERCOSUR because of its geography, economy, 
and political stability.130 Regional integration for Brazil should act as an overarching 
objective of increasing its power and autonomy in the context of a broader strategy of 
global economic insertion and projection onto the international stage. They view Brazil’s 
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regional integration as a counter to the exogenous U.S.-led FTAA negotiation process and 
not for the betterment of the LATAM states.131 Brazil attempts to build relations with the 
European Union and China, while viewing both as competitors on the world stage. Both of 
these trade partnerships are more beneficial to Brazil than the respective partners. On one 
hand, Brazil fails to negotiate trade agreements with the EU, and on the other, increasing 
trade with China impedes the domestic demand of Brazilian manufactured goods. Since 
both countries primarily export manufactured goods, Brazil cannot match the cheap labor 
of the Chinese market. 
D. ECONOMIC LIMITATIONS 
Hal Brands focuses on a series of “dilemmas” in discussing Brazilian grand strategy 
that coincide with Brazil’s international aspirations of global power. Of these dilemmas, the 
internal and regional dilemmas play a major role in shaping Brazil’s grand strategy. 
According to Brands, grand strategy is the allocation of resources to meet international 
goals. In other words, “Grand strategy is the relation of means to ends, the process by 
which nations harness and allocate resources in the service of their international 
objectives.132 The four dilemmas he proposes for Brazil are internal, regional, international, 
and a weak relationship with the United States. The internal factors force an inward 
focused government instead of one devoted to foreign policy to fix the domestic problems. 
The regional dilemma turns toward membership in multilateral coalitions and Brazil’s 
pursuit of regional hegemony. The international dilemma focuses on the limited 
cohesiveness of BRIC and Brazil’s support of Iran. The weak relationship with the U.S. 
focuses on competition and implications from Brazil’s support for Iran.   
Brands attributes the internal dilemmas to poor infrastructure, rampant crime, and 
excessive taxation. The poor infrastructure deficiencies that Brands focuses on are the rail 
system and ports. In 2004, only 10 percent of Brazil’s roads were paved, and the railroad 
system was severely under-developed.133 This creates a major problem for the agricultural 
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sector as road transportation accounts for the majority of goods transferred from the 
Center-West Savanna. As Lael Brainard points out that road transportation “represents 61 
percent of total freight, whereas railroads and waterways account only for 23 and 13.6 
percent respectively.”134 The ports are also inefficient to the point that cargo often takes 
three weeks or more before shipping.135 To reinforce the internal dilemma, Brands 
illustrates slow growth rates and innovation, but fails to recognize that Brazil’s economy is 
the seventh largest in the world. He also fails to mention the shift toward foreign 
investment in Brazil over the last few years. The World Cup and 2016 Olympics are two 
major upcoming events that will potentially further increase foreign investment and 
funding for infrastructure deficiencies.   
Rampant crime in the favelas is another internal factor that causes resources to be 
funneled toward internal security rather than development. The rich can afford the luxury 
of security through gated communities, security guards, and bulletproofing cars.136 In 
contrast, the poor are forced to form alliances with favela leaders or take up arms against 
them. Well-armed gangs and growth of the illicit economy are fueling crime that hinders 
economic performance and lowers prestige abroad.137 Subsequently, the crime and 
violence in the favelas escalates and forces further allocation of security forces and 
resources. Brands briefly mentions reform policy, but fails to mention the impact of Lula’s 
Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) to improve the country’s infrastructure—specifically 
favela and reconstruction improvements. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
investments for structural improvements and additions for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 
Olympics “from 2010 through 2016 will reach approximately $50 billion USD, including 
airport renovation, stadium construction and renovations and infrastructure projects—all in 
preparation for the thousands of tourists who will attend these major events.”138  
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A third internal dilemma is how Brazil forces taxes its citizenry excessively to 
alleviate social and political issues while income distribution continues to plague the 
country. As David Fleischer points out, taxation in Brazil is approximately 30 percent, 
which has historically stimulated major protests and riots.139 In 2013, Brazilians broke out 
in riots over a nine-cent increase in bus fares because there is no evidence of the tax money 
being used for infrastructure, airports, and roads the public directly benefits from. In short, 
the internal dilemmas cause a diversion of resources from development to security and 
diminish public support for the political leadership. Excessive taxation still presents a 
major obstacle to public support because it forces the government to focus on internal 
issues over the foreign policy necessary for global power status. As for income distribution, 
Brazil continues to have the worst Gini index across all of LATAM. Meyer notes “the 
wealthiest 10 percent of the population accounts for 45 percent of national income, which 
is more than the bottom 80 percent combined.”140 As of 2012, Brazil is the 17th most 
unequal income distribution country in the world at 51.9 on the Gini index.141 As 
previously mentioned, Brazil is attempting to curb poverty and income distribution by 
investing in socio-economic programs with positive results, but it persists as one of the 
many ongoing internal dilemmas. 
Shifting to regional dilemmas, Brazil’s role in multilateral trade organizations and 
pursuit of regional hegemony contradict the idea of common good and self-interest. Brazil 
is unwilling to surrender its power and sovereignty to a judicial or legislative body. To 
form a multilateral or regional coalition, each country gives up a certain portion of 
sovereignty under the notion that each member will benefit mutually. Brazil does not want 
to succumb to the power of another regional LATAM state. Therefore, its interest in 
regional integration vis-à-vis Mercosur is to increase its influence, and not for the common 
good of LATAM.142 Consequently, Brands’ argues that Brazil’s diplomacy and trade 
                                                 
139 Thomas Bruneau, “Historical Background of Brazil” (Lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School on 
History of Contemporary Brazil, Monterey, CA, July 23, 2013). 
140 Meyer, “Brazil-U.S. Relations,” 8.  
141 CIA, “Country Comparison: Distribution of Family Income - Gini Index.” Central Intelligence 
Agency The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library /publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html?countryname =Brazil&countrycode =br&regionCode=soa&rank=17#br. 
142 Brands, Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy, 38–39.  
 42 
policies are self-interested, thus limit their chance for regional hegemony. Brainard argues 
that the major problem with Mercosur is policy design.143 He refers to the Common 
External Tariff that seeks to promote Brazilian industrial interests where high tariffs on 
capital goods force the burden of costs on the producers in Brazil, and these costs are then 
applied to the consumers primarily in Uruguay and Paraguay.144 If Brazil was concerned 
with the interests of its members within Mercosur, then it would want a more solid and 
cohesive economic foundation that allowed the benefits of a common market with reduced 
costs for the consumer. Mercosur also presents challenges to Brazil’s desire for bilateral 
trade agreements. Mercosur also challenges the power of other emerging LATAM states 
(i.e. Mexico, Chile, Colombia) typically aligned with the U.S. while Brazil and Venezuela 
attempt to exert control over other regions.   
The size and economic capacity of Brazil allows a certain degree of influence on 
global politics. Without having the economy or military comparable to other global entities 
(U.S., China, and the EU), Brazil seeks strategic partnerships and alliances that cause 
economic challenges. Brands argues that Brazil’s alignment with Iran and the limited 
cohesiveness of BRIC countries cause economic and diplomatic consequences.145 In 2010, 
President Lula supported President Ahmadinejad when the U.S. was imposing economic 
sanctions on Iran through the UN. Brazil refused to denounce Iran’s nuclear program and 
UN sanctions. In an attempt to become a mediator between the U.S. and Iran, Brazil came 
to an agreement with Turkey to allow Tehran to ship a portion of uranium abroad for 
enrichment. This diplomatic alignment was a means to enhance Brazil-Iran relations for 
two reasons. First, it was an attempt increase relations with other Middle Eastern countries. 
Second, it was a means to create autonomy from the U.S. as a rising power. Brazil’s 
support of Iran’s nuclear development program has caused increased political tension with 
the U.S.; however, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce the overall balance of 
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trade doubled from 6 to 15 billion USD from 2009−2013.146 One economic impact with 
the Brazil-Iran relationship was the inability to negotiate a 54-cent hemispheric-wide tariff 
on ethanol per gallon imposed by the United States. The increased political tension from 
Brazil’s support of Iran provided little incentive for the U.S. to negotiate; however, the 
tariff was eliminated in 2012 to promote a hemispheric wide zone for ethanol trade.   
The primacy of national interests causes the limited cohesiveness of the BRIC 
members. On one hand, BRIC members are allies when opposing the U.S., but competitors 
in trade and economic practices. An example is how Brazil views Chinese imports as a 
threat to its market because of China’s cheaper manufacturing costs. The BRIC members 
have increased overall trade over the last decade, but the geographic proximity of Russia, 
India, and China presents competition within the region. Brands’ argues that the increase of 
power within BRIC will cause more friction in time for resource allocation and market 
competition for leading export commodities.147 With BRIC nations accounting for a 
quarter of the world’s land mass and more that 40 percent of the global population, future 
competition over resources in Africa will cause more friction between these nations. 
Although these countries are the hottest rising economic powers, competition and existing 
trade blocs will hinder the notion of a free trade agreement or collaboration as a trade bloc 
within the BRIC nations.  
Another dilemma for Brazil’s quest for global power is the weak relationship with 
the United States. Susanne Gratius argues that the U.S. serves as a market and not a 
political partner. The basis for this argument is that Brazil’s defense ministry, Itamaraty, 
dedicates 70 percent of its effort toward the region—not the U.S. or EU.148 Brazil’s ability 
to increase the balance of trade with the U.S. is working to its advantage economically, but 
many obstacles prevent a mutually beneficial political relationship between the two 
economic powers. Brands argues that “Brazil seeks to displace the United States as the 
dominant power in South America, and this objective brings with it an elevated risk of 
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bilateral conflict.”149 As two of the top ethanol and cotton exports, Brazil and the U.S. have 
a history of economic disagreements due to the competition in the global market. As 
previously mentioned, the ethanol agreement in 2012 lifted tariffs on exports, allowing for 
increased trade. As for cotton, the U.S. was found illegally subsidizing its farmers and 
Brazil took a claim up to the WTO for dispute settlement. The U.S. was found at fault, but 
the WTO could not force repayment to Brazilian farmers, so Brazil threatened to increase 
tariffs on its imports from its Northern neighbor in retaliation. This action, known as the 
cotton war, led to the U.S. and Brazilian farmers receiving subsidies to make the 
international market fair.   
Brazil and the U.S. share an ideal of liberal economy, democratic rule, 
counterterrorism and drug trafficking; however, Brazil is opposed to U.S. hegemony in 
South America. The FTAA, Washington Consensus, and Plan Colombia are a few 
examples of the U.S. imposing its ideals on LATAM. Brazil is not against these plans, but 
is against the U.S. exerting hegemonic influence across LATAM toward a unipolar 
system.150 With the lift of ethanol tariffs, cotton settlement, and President Rousseff’s 
denouncement of Iranian human rights violations, Brazil-U.S. relations are of economic 
cooperation and political separation. For Brazil to emerge as a global power, it needs to 
have political influence that either aligns with the U.S. or another global power to push the 
international community toward a multipolar system. 
Brazil’s grand strategy has several dilemmas or limitations that prevent its 
realization of global power. Brands’ categorizes four areas that present dilemmas for 
Brazil’s strategy: internal, regional, international, and a weak relationship with the United 
States Increased trade relations with China, Africa, and the EU are Brazil’s attempt to 
counter the hegemony of the U.S. and encourage a multipolar economic and political 
system. Brand’s suggestion is that “Brazil must work toward a sustainable modus vivendi 
with the U.S.”151 With the direction of Brazil’s trade diversification as a South-South 
model and its inability to establish itself as the South American hegemon, the U.S. will 
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likely not recognize a need for improving relations—unless Brazil is able to make the 
relationship benefit the U.S. 
Chapter II assessed the extent to which domestic factors shape and influence the 
role of Brazil in world affairs, and the domestic political and political economic factors that 
contributed to neoliberal reform in Brazil. The analysis explained gradual market reform 
and shock therapy as the two most popular paths to economic growth that Brazil attempted 
during its military rule, transition to democracy, and consolidation of democracy phases. 
First, this chapter argued that economic crisis and an ideational approach (learning from 
previous mistakes) are the primary contributing factors to neo-liberal reform and the 
economic success of the Brazilian economy. Subsequently, this economic success provides 
the foundation for the argument of Brazil as a global power. Furthermore, the economic 
success of Brazil enables it to extend diplomatic influence through trade and partnerships. 
Overall, neoliberal reform explains how Brazil became open to trade; trade and 
partnerships provides a description of one dimension of Brazil’s power in the global arena. 
Finally, the emergence of Brazil as a competitive global market contributes to a shift in the 
international balance of power from a bipolar/unipolar to a multipolar system.   
In the last 50 years, Brazil experienced periods of high economic growth followed 
by recession because its economy was reliant on the commodities market. When 
commodities prices dropped, Brazil’s economy would suffer. To alleviate this pressure, 
Brazil diversified its trade partnerships and began to exert its influence in the global 
economy. The choice for neoliberal reform in Brazil went back and forth between drastic 
shock therapy and gradual market reform. The latter became the best choice, in the 1990s, 
with the Real Plan because the government learned from the previous failures of the shock 
therapy programs.   
The EU, China, and Africa offer Brazil opportunities for future economic growth, 
but each partnership presents challenges as well. During last decade, Brazil has performed, 
developed, and sustained economic growth that has placed it as the seventh largest 
economy in the world. The consolidation of democracy and good economic policy show 
that Brazil is a rising economic power with diminishing debt and increasing surpluses. 
Internal dilemmas of income distribution, high taxes, and infrastructure deficiencies will 
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continue to plague the country. Once Brazil is able to overcome these issues, it may gain 
more recognition as a world power. For now, Brazil will continue to be considered an 
emerging power or middle power alongside the other BRIC nations as it continues the 
quest to overcome the hegemony of the U.S. Improved relations with the U.S. may help to 
overcome this hurdle, but Brazil must be willing to align for or against the U.S. This means 
that Brazil must be willing to move away from its middle power and inward focused 
strategy and forge stronger foreign relations with or against the world powers. These 
relationships will give Brazil more diplomatic power alongside its economic power as a 
major hegemon among the world’s elite countries. Based on the economy and trade, Brazil 
is far from reaching global power status, and it remains a middle power. 
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III. BRAZILIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
A. BACKGROUND OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
In the last 20 years, Brazil has an increasingly sought recognition and respect as an 
international player. President Dilma Rousseff insists that if Brazil expects to be treated as 
a first-world player, it must behave like one: “we are the sixth economy in the world and 
want to be a developed Country, with a high human development index. Our Armed Forces 
must also be equal to the country on meritocracy, professionalism, technical capacity and, 
moreover, dissuasive capacity.”152 Increased defense spending, increased size of force, and 
advanced technological upgrades have produced the largest capable military force in Latin 
America, one that is even a contender in the international arena should Brasilia decide to 
play an international role.153 Brazil has begun to accept international norms in missile and 
arms exports, and works to constrain nuclear proliferation as a few examples of how it has 
begun to accept its responsibilities as an international power. Improved bilateral relations 
with Argentina, Sweden, and France also demonstrates its ability to form defense 
partnerships to upgrade its defense technology, and together with constructive engagement 
increase security in the global environment. Despite these advances, this chapter argues that 
Brazil’s military capabilities fall short of those of a global power. Furthermore, Brazil’s 
national security strategy and its allocation of defense dollars seem to be at odds with a 
foreign policy that continually attempts to justify procurement of improved technology and 
enhanced military assets in order to construct a force capable of playing an international 
role.  
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Brazilian has gradually reconnected with the international community since the 
military returned to the barracks in 1985. In August 1990, Brazil formally accepted the 
right of the international community to monitor human rights and promote reform, a right 
that has been recognized by successive presidents. President Cardoso extended monitoring 
of human rights and, it was again by Lula da Silva and Rousseff. In July 1992, Brazil 
ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights and signed the Non-
proliferation treaty in 1994. In 1995, Brazil placed export controls on nuclear materials and 
joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. A year later, Brazil also became a member 
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.154   
According to the Brazilian National Defense Strategy, there are four guiding 
principles of Brazilian foreign policy: non-intervention, self-determination, international 
cooperation, and peaceful conflict resolution.155 These principles exemplify the 
liberalization of Brasilia’s foreign policy, while it attempts to build a military force worthy 
of global powers, by increasing technology transfers and capabilities. For example, Brazil 
partnered with SAAB for new combat aircraft, which in the future will be built in country. 
It is also collaborating with France on nuclear technology transfer in hope of acquiring a 
nuclear submarine. Brazil’s foreign policy also aims to achieve three goals: strengthen ties 
with other LATAM nations, engage in multilateral diplomacy through the UN and the 
OAS, and act as countervailing force to U.S. political and economic influence in LATAM. 
This regional stance has led the debate, especially in the United States and Mexico, to 
claim that Brazil seeks to be a South American, rather than a Latin American hegemon.   
This chapter aims to assess three aspects of Brazil’s hard power capabilities: 
military spending, defense partnerships, and fungible assets. Military spending is important 
to understand how Brazil is translating economic growth into military power. Defense 
partnerships are important for the transfer of technology as Brazil strives for nuclear 
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capabilities. The fungible assets (personnel, tanks, combat aircraft, and surface combatant 
ships) have led to an increase in defense spending, and the size of military force has Brazil 
as the top military power in LATAM. Lastly, this chapter will argue that Brazil is far from 
reaching the capabilities of the United States, China, Russia, and India. Brazil is slowly 
acquiring assets and technology, and it is increasing military spending to give the 
perception that it is comparable global power. However, many of its programs are prestige 
projects that do not translate into any applicable military capability in a regional context. 
For Brazil to achieve global power status, it requires at least four times the military assets 
(including personnel), nuclear technology, and stronger defense partnerships.  
Using John Mearsheimer’s offensive realist framework, this chapter will assess 
Brazil’s land power in three sections. The first section will provide an analysis of the 
military capabilities of Brazil utilizing data from Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), Jane’s International Defense Review, and the Military Balance provided 
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). This first section will quantify 
Brazil’s military expenditure, personnel, and assets. This section will also analyze the 
increased partnerships that Brazil is building to gain technology and increase its hard power 
capabilities. The second section provides a comparative analysis of the BRIC members to 
determine the power status of Brazil in relation to the other emerging powers. The final 
section of this chapter will determine the gaps or limitations in hard power capabilities in 
achieving global power status. In doing so, this chapter will explore the areas that matter 
most for hard power including military spending, size of force, and technology of its forces.  
B. DEFENSE SPENDING 
1. Internal Military Budget 
Brazil’s focus on the defense and military sectors is a recent phenomenon. The 
2013 SIPRI yearbook calculated that Brazil’s defense spending rose at a rate of 50 percent 
from 2006 to 2008, which ranks 11th in the world at $33.5 billion dollars.156 Brazil has 
historically possessed the largest military force in LATAM and contributes more to 
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military spending than any other nation in Latin American nation. In 2007, Brazil’s military 
expenditure was $15 billion, and is now at $34 billion.157 Between 2004−2010, Brazil’s 
military expenditure increased at an average rate of 6.9 percent.158 In 2010, Brazil’s 
military expenditure was $33.5 billion USD, which is a 9 percent increase over 2009.159 
The only major cuts in defense spending include 2003 and 2011 where Presidents Lula da 
Silva and Rousseff, respectively cut spending to reallocate resources. In 2003, Lula cut the 
military budget as a part of the zero hunger program aimed at reducing the levels of poverty 
and inequality in Brazil.160 As mentioned in Chapter II, although the level of poverty has 
decreased, it remains a socioeconomic issue. As the region’s leading defense spender, 
Brazil experienced an 8.2 percent, or $2.8 billion, cut in its military budget as part of efforts 
by President Rousseff to cool its economy and reduce inflation.161 This reduction in 
defense spending was also due to the decline in the overall GDP from 2011−2012, which 
was a direct result of global recession that sparked a price decline in commodities in the 
international market.  
In 2011, many of the global powers also reduced military spending. According to 
SIPRI, “Six of the world’s top military spenders—Brazil, France, Germany, India, the 
United Kingdom and the United States—made cuts in their military budgets in 2011, in 
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international community was decreasing military spending because of the global market 
declines. The only significant exceptions were China and Russia, which had significant 
increases in military spending.163 
Although Brazil is the leading defense spender in LATAM, it does not spend as 
much as other regional competitors or global powers as a percentage of overall GDP. 
According to 2013 SIPRI database, Brazil spent 1.5 percent of its GDP on military 
expenditures, however Jane’s reported the figure to be 1.2 percent in 2012 and 2013. Jane’s 
also argues that defense spending is maintained below 1.5 percent to restrict “military 
funding as a way of maintaining civilian control over the armed forces - a reaction to the 
end of military dictatorship in 1985 - and the lack of external threats to the county’s 
territorial integrity.”164 This statistic falls behind Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay 
that spent 3.3, 2.1, 2.0, and 1.6 percent respectively of overall GDP for military spending. 
As for the emerging BRIC nations, military spending as a percentage of GDP is 4.4, 2.5, 
and 2.1 percent for Russia, India, and China correspondingly. The U.S. spends 4.4 percent 
of it GDP on its military budget. If Brazil were building a comparable force to project hard 
power, its military spending should account for a much larger percentage of its overall 
GDP.165   
2. Brazil Defense Budget Breakdown 
Brazil’s defense budget is divided into four categories: personnel, maintenance, 
procurement and investment, and debt interest payments. The individual services (Navy, 
Army, and Air Force) further separate the first three categories. Figure one below shows a 
complete breakdown of resource allocation for defense spending in billions of Real in 
2012. In 2008, personnel account approximately 79 percent of the overall military budget, 
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which was reduced to 68 percent in 2013.166 This is the most common statistic used to 
discredit the argument that military spending has increased in Brazil. That said, however, 
pensions have a significant impact on the domestic market because the majority of service 
members are stationed within the borders of Brazil. These service members spend their 
income in Brazil’s domestic market, which contributes to the overall GDP through 
corporate, sales, and income taxes.  
 
Figure 1.  Brazil Defense Expenditure Breakdown167 
The Navy and Air Force are close in personnel spending, while the Army accounts 
for twice the spending of each of the aforementioned branches of service. This is because 
the Army has a significantly higher number of soldiers than the other branches. The 
maintenance and other expenses for each service are similar, and they account for just over 
17 percent of the budget. The remaining 8 percent of the budget goes to procurement,  
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investments, and debt interest payments. The economic growth over the last decade, as 
mentioned in Chapter II, has enabled Brazil to invest in technology to upgrade its force and 
capabilities through defense partnerships. 
C. DEFENSE PARTNERSHIPS 
As an emerging power, Brazil aims to build relationships with strategic partners 
that have technology. In this search, Brazil is working with the French defense ministry in 
hope of improving its conventional and creating its nuclear-powered submarine 
programs.168 President Rousseff inaugurated a factory in 2013 that will make metal hull 
structures for four conventional diesel-electric Scorpene attack submarines and eventually a 
fifth nuclear reactor powered submarine developed in Brazil with French technology. This 
technology improvement has been funded and is in the development stages with an 
anticipated entry into service around 2023.169  Currently, the five members of the UNSC 
have nuclear submarines, and Brazil anticipates that acquiring this technology will give it 
more recognition on the world stage as a viable addition to the permanent members of the 
council. In other words, Brazilian leadership believes that a nuclear submarine is its ticket 
to becoming a permanent member on the UNSC. Another reason for the acquisition of 
nuclear propelled submarines is to protect Brazil’s economic interests. These interests are 
in the recently discovered off shore pre-salt reserves that contain oil, and the 95 percent of 
Brazilian international trade through commercial shipping.170   
The Brazilian Navy is also enhancing its surface fleet to add coastal defense and 
patrolling of the pre-salt reserves. According to Jane’s, Brazil acquired six more patrol craft 
between 2009 and 2010, and it estimates production of 10 more ships after 2020.171  In 
addition, three Amazonas class frigates and two Macaé-class patrol craft have were 
received in Brazil in the last two years, but overall naval procurement has slowed due to the 
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current stagnating economy.172 This particular enhancement is primarily for brown water 
security rather than for power projection. On the other hand, Brazil also aims to replace its 
non-operational aircraft carrier. Jane’s reports that the project and costs are merely 
speculative and that the projected service date is approximately 2040.173 Brazil may aspire 
to build an aircraft carrier, but not in the near future. 
The Brazilian Air Force (FAB) is also seeking to improve its outdated aircraft with 
new technology. In May 2011, Saab opened the Swedish–Brazilian Centre of Research and 
Innovation in S o Bernardo de Campo, aimed at strengthening Brazil’s domestic research 
sector.174 Brazil and Saab agreed on a $4.5 billion contract to Saab in December of 2013 to 
replace its aging fleet of fighter jets and gain the aviation technology transfer for future 
development. This deal preempted a deal previously on track with the United States 
through Boeing, and it coincidently happened after news of U.S. spying on Brazilians was 
exposed by the Edward Snowden leaks. However, Jane’s reported, “The Gripen bid was 
valued at USD 4.5 billion, compared with the Dassault offer of $8 billion, and Boeing’s 
$7.5 billion package.”175 This shows that one of the clear reasons for choosing Saab was 
the cheaper cost of production. The contract with Saab will supply Brazil’s air force with 
36 new Gripen NG fighters by 2020. Aside from the cost of the jets themselves, the 
agreement is expected to generate billions of additional dollars in future supply and service 
contracts. The future revenue that Brazil hopes to generate is through using its previous 
history of ISI where it imports the technology and equipment to eventually manufacture 
domestically. This technology transfer is what Brazil is currently focusing on to enhance its 
internal production capacity of combat aircraft. The technology transfer also coincides with 
the National Strategy of Defense, which states that 
according to the second model, a fifth-generation jet fighter would be 
purchased in a negotiation involving the full transfer of technology, 
including the aircraft’s design and manufacturing technologies, and their 
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relevant “source-codes.” The purchase would be made at the minimum 
necessary scale allowing the full transfer of these technologies. A 
Brazilian company starts producing a substitute for that purchased aircraft, 
under the guidance of the Brazilian State, authorized by prior negotiation 
with the selling country and company. The solution in focus would occur 
in a sequence, and not concurrently.176  
Brazil is also working with Denel, a South African defense contractor, to build an 
air-to-air missile to outfit its future Gripen aircraft. This deal, worth about $672,000 USD, 
was brokered in 2007 with an anticipated delivery for 2013. So far, no unclassified data 
sources show if this technology has reached Brazil. Brazil and South Africa also 
collaborated on a missile-building factory for the A-Darter 5th generation air-to-air missile, 
in the Sao Jose dos Campos industrial park, and aim to expand this partnership to other 
defense related areas.177 Additionally, the European missile house Matra BAe Dynamics 
(MBD) worked with Brazil to transfer technology on the Block I MM40 Exocet renovation 
and maintenance program, which had a successful test fire in 2012.178 These enhancements 
in missile technology and combat aircraft allow Brazil to build hard power capabilities and 
partnerships for the transfer of technology to expand its research and development in the 
defense industry. 
D. FORCE PROJECTION 
Brazil’s national defense strategy has three main guiding principles: sea denial, sea 
control, and power projection.179 President Lula and Defense Minister Nelson Jobim 
argued that these three principles have the following objectives: 
a) Proactive defense of the oil platforms; b) Proactive defense of naval and 
port facilities, archipelagos and oceanic islands located within the 
Brazilian jurisdictional waters; c) Promptness to respond to any threat 
against sea lanes of trade, by States, or by non-conventional or criminal 
forces; d) Capacity to join international peacekeeping operations outside 
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of the territory and the Brazilian jurisdictional waters, under the aegis of 
the United Nations or other multilateral organizations in the region.180 
To achieve these objectives, Brazil is expanding its naval assets. For the purpose of 
this analysis, we will classify naval assets into three categories: submarine, patrol craft, and 
principle surface combatants. Currently, Brazil has four operational diesel submarines that 
are undergoing modifications and refurbishments.181  As previously mentioned, Brazil is 
using its trade partnerships to produce several additional ship types, including a nuclear 
submarine. Brazilian patrol craft include Corvettes, various patrol boats, and minesweepers. 
These ships are equipped with ant-submarine and surface weapon systems. Brazil has 
approximately 50 of these ships in its total inventory.182 As for principle surface combatant 
ships, the total inventory is 15 ships that include a non-operational aircraft carrier, a few 
destroyers, and several frigates.183 To put into perspective, the United States is currently 
decommissioning its frigate fleet because of the obsolete technology of the aging class of 
ship. In this regard, Brazil severely lacks a capable anti-air ship to engage in its guiding 
principles. With the procurement of future fleet assets in submarines and patrol craft, Brazil 
is limited to coastal defense, and it will not achieve power projection or sea control in the 
foreseeable future. As for personnel, the Brazilian Navy employs approximately 59,000 in 
the fleet and 2,500 in its aviation community.184 Brazilian naval assets can deploy 
approximately 60 to 70 tanks for a power project at full capacity, which means that its 
ability to project power is severely limited. Brands argues that the United States policing of 
international waters allows Brazil to focus more on coastal defense assets and free flow of 
its commercial trade.185    
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1. Land-Based Assets 
Historically, the Brazilian Army is the strongest and largest branch of service in 
Brazil. There are 190,000 total personnel with approximately 70,000 comprised of 
conscripts.186 The Army’s capabilities include the number of tanks, reconnaissance 
vehicles, and aircraft. As of 2013, there are various models of tanks within the Brazilian 
Army, and the total amount is approximately 405 (main battle tanks and light tanks).187 
Woodland and forest cover about 67 percent of Brazil, which most likely explains the lack 
of attention in newer or more tanks in the region. Brazil also has just over 400 
reconnaissance vehicles that are starting to see an upgrade in the last few years. In 2012, 
the Accelerated Growth Program allocated approximately $320 million to the Army for its 
purchase of 40 amphibious Guaranis and 30 Astros 2020 MLRS.188 The amphibious 
Guaranis is a troop transporter similar to the U.S. Strykers, and the Astros 2020 MLRS 
(artillery saturation rocket system) is a truck loaded out with a multiple launching rocket 
system. The Army’s aircraft includes 31 attack helicopters and 44 transport helicopters, 
which 32 of the latter are being armed for scout, support, and attack roles.189 The most 
recent addition to the Army aviation is the Hermes 450 provided by Israel, which is an 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).190 These UAVs are being employed for surveillance of 
counter-narcotic and drug trafficking in conjunction with the Integrated Border Monitoring 
System (SISFRON) over the Amazon.191 
2. Air Force Assets 
The Brazilian Air Force is slightly larger than the Navy for personnel, and its 
aircraft are completely outdated. The 2013 military balance shows that the Brazilian Air 
Force has approximately 69,500 personnel.192 There are about 234 combat aircraft in the 
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inventory, and Brazil hopes to produce about 30 to 40 more planes by 2020 from its Saab 
partnership.193  One of the primary reasons for the small number of aircraft is that Brazil 
has no direct military threat. The Air Force’s primary focus is on training and surveillance 
of the Amazon region, which supports the Army and Federal Police in the fight against 
drug trafficking. Currently, the FAB is working on the United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) supporting the United Nations effort. Further Brazilian 
influence vis-à-vis MINUSTAH will be assessed in Chapter IV.    
3. Nuclear Technology 
The Tlatelolco regime provides another example of how weak states use IOs to 
achieve liberal aims.194 The Tlatelolco Treaty prohibits Latin American states from 
acquiring, possessing, developing, testing, or using nuclear weapons, and prohibits other 
countries from storing and deploying nuclear weapons on their territories. The Tlatelolco 
regime encompasses the majority of Latin America that became signatories of the treaty 
and promoted nuclear non-proliferation with the initial exceptions of Mexico and Cuba, 
which signed the treaty in the 1990s. Brazil initially signed the treaty, but did not ratify or 
adhere to it until 1994.195 With nuclear proliferation on the rise during and after the Cuban 
Missile crisis (1962), the weaker Latin American states, unlike Brazil, needed protection 
against a nuclear threat. During the 1960s, a normative belief formed in Latin America for 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.196 This normative belief left Latin American states 
with the option to remain under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, achieve 
individual nuclear status, or find means to promote non-proliferation. The consensus 
forming in LATAM for non-proliferation was against any possession or use of nuclear 
technology. The third option was to seek an alternative approach for non-proliferation. The 
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approach to promote non-proliferation was meant to create a legally binding means to 
prevent the use and distribution of nuclear weapons technology in Latin America through 
the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(OPANAL). The Treaty of Tlatelolco (1968) established a nuclear-free zone in LATAM 
and imposed legal restrictions on the use and distribution of nuclear weapons technology 
from the major powers to Latin America.197 This treaty, from a liberal perspective, was 
arguably a legalistic means to protect Latin America from a future nuclear threat because 
there was an increased consensus in support of non-proliferation in the region. 
Brazil’s nuclear project in the 1970s offers an example of a realist policy to gain 
power and influence as an emerging power. The origins of this policy can be found in the 
Cuban missile crisis, where the Western Hemisphere had a direct external nuclear threat to 
its security. So what explains the reason for Brazil furthering its nuclear capabilities 
without a viable external threat a decade later while the region focused on non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons? With a regional consensus converging on denuclearization after the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), Brazil proceeded to promote nuclear non-proliferation while 
secretly gaining nuclear technology. The reasoning, from an offensive realist perspective, 
coincides with Steven David’s hypothesis that “those in power will do what is necessary to 
stay in power.”198 Brazil desires to become a nuclear power in hope of gaining independent 
nuclear technology to earn a place among the world elite. This nuclear desire can also be 
attributed to relative isolation from the American nuclear umbrella as a means of gaining 
additional security against the major powers—a defensive realist notion. Ultimately, 
nuclear technology for Brazil would give them legitimacy among the great powers as a 
realist foreign policy strategy. 
The reason for Brazil’s initial rejection of the non-proliferation treaty and eventual 
concession goes back to the military regime (1964–85). Arturo Sotomayor argues, “Brazil’s 
initial refusal to join the nonproliferation regime was not solely based on economic or 
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technical grounds, but on military motivations.”199 The military motivations can be found 
in the regimes covert commitment to developing a nuclear weapon. In 1985, Brazil also 
opened its first nuclear plant. After Brazil gained nuclear power for energy, the military 
wanted to further the research in hope of gaining weapons grade uranium enrichment. The 
reasoning for Brazil joining the non-proliferation regime in 1994 is based on the 
democratization process and the diminished military power over foreign policy.200 With the 
military returning to the barracks, the President Collor initiated the civilian control of 
nuclear technology. With no viable threats, Brazil signed onto the non-proliferation treaty 
to ensure civilian oversight with the nuclear technology and reduced the power of the 
military.   
Brazil’s desire for enriched uranium remains a priority to fuel its future nuclear 
submarine. The World Nuclear association argues that most western submarines require 
greater than 20 percent enriched uranium, and the newer French technology fuels its fleet 
with 7.5 percent.201 Either way, Brazil is working with the French to transfer technology to 
build a nuclear capable submarine. Its lack of transparency in regard to nuclear technology 
raises the question of how capable Brazil is in the enrichment process, and where will it 
stop. The addition of a nuclear submarine will not give Brazil added power, but the highly 
enriched uranium process would. 
E. CAPABILITIES COMPARED TO LATIN AMERICA 
Brazil is the largest defense spender in LATAM. The 2014 Military Balance 
assesses that Colombia (9.9 percent), Mexico (8.2 percent), and Venezuela (7.2 percent) are 
the three largest players with Brazil (49 percent) in total defense spending across LATAM. 
When comparing Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela to Brazil, military spending as a 
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percentage of overall GDP is 2.1, 0.5, and 0.98 percent respectively. Comparatively, Brazil 
spends more than Colombia, but less that Mexico and Venezuela according to the 
percentage of GDP allocated to military spending. As for number of total personnel, Brazil 
stands as an unmatched power in LATAM. For the Navy, Brazil has just over 10,000 more 
personnel employed than the other nations—Colombia at 46,0000, and Mexico at 58,0000. 
For the Army, Brazil (190,000) has slightly fewer personnel than Colombia with 221,000 
and Mexico with 200,000. This is not much of an issue for Brazil as it can theoretically 
mobilize a reserve force of 1.3 million personnel. For the Air Force, Brazil has 
approximately 50,000 more personnel than the largest forces in LATAM (Colombia 14.000 
and Mexico 12,000). 
1. Military Assets of Latin America 
As the largest military force, Brazil also has superior capabilities. The Colombian 
Navy has a comparable number of patrol craft and submarines, but Brazil has three times 
the amount of surface combatants. The Colombian Army has a comparable number of 
reconnaissance vehicles, but it does not have any tanks in service. The Colombian Air 
Force also has a third the number of combat aircraft as the FAB.  
Mexico has more than twice the fleet of patrol craft of Brazil, but it also has half the 
amount of surface combatants. The Mexican Army also lacks tanks, and focuses its assets 
in reconnaissance and armored personnel carriers—which is significantly less than Brazil. 
The Mexican Air Force, similar to Colombia, has a third of the number of combat aircraft 
when compared to Brazil.  
Venezuela has the smallest fleet out of the countries assessed. The Venezuelan 
Army is the largest competitor in LATAM to Brazil with 282 tanks. The Venezuelan Air 
Force is larger than Colombia and Mexico, but its 95 combat aircraft is still more than half 
the size of the FAB.   
Argentina is the closes competitor to the Brazilian Navy with four less surface 
combatants. The Argentine Army has approximately 336 tanks, which makes it the largest 
competitor on the ground. The Argentine Air Force is similar to the rest of LATAM, and its 
100 combat aircraft are no match for the FAB.   
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For hard power capabilities and defense expenditure, Brazil stands far superior to 
the rest of LATAM. To match the capabilities of Brazil, the other Latin American nations 
would require alliances. Since LATAM has been relatively absent from global conflicts and 
total war in South America, the states have not experienced a direct international threat to 
build massive militaries like the United States, Russia, China, or the European nations. 
Brazil has gained enough military strength to counter any of its regional competitors, which 
is why it is still a middle or regional power at best—militarily speaking in terms of hard 
power. 
F. CAPABILITIES COMPARED TO BRIC 
In 2013, Russia’s GDP was $2.21 trillion, and its defense expenditure was $68.2 
billion. The major difference in defense spending is that Russia uses nearly half of its 
budget on the State Armaments Programme—a procurement of arms program though the 
state-owned defense industry.202 This shows that its foreign policy is based on increasing 
its hard power capabilities, and not just paying its service members like Brazil. The Russian 
Navy is far superior to that of Brazil. The Russian Navy has almost twice the number of 
personnel (130,000), eight times the submarine fleet (64), and twice the surface combatants 
(33). The Russian Army has 2,550 tanks and the ability to transport up to 243—if all 
amphibious ships were deployed.203 Its personnel, including Army and Airborne at 
285,000, account for almost 100,000 more troops than Brazil. Brazil does not have a 
comparable tank inventory in Russia, but it does have an equal force within its own border 
based on the amount Russia could deploy in a conflict. The Russian Air Force has 1389 
combat aircraft and 150,000 personnel, which is far superior to the Brazilian Air Force. 
When compared to Russia, Brazil has a long time before it can possess comparable 
capabilities.204 
                                                 
202 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter 5: Russia and Eurasia,” The Military Balance 
114, no. 1 (2013), 163.  
203 Ibid., 181, 184. 
204 Ibid., 181–182. 
 63 
1. India 
In 2013, Brazil was equivalent to India in economic growth and defense spending. 
India’s GDP was 1.97 trillion, and its defense spending was estimated at $36 billion. India, 
similar to Russia, has a much larger military than Brazil. India’s Army at 1.1 million 
personnel and almost 2900 tanks is far from comparable to Brazil. The Indian Navy has 
58,350 personnel, 14 submarines, and 25 surface combatants. India’s Air Force has 
127,000 personnel and 866 combat aircraft, which is also no match for the Brazilian Air 
Force. The Indian military is extremely large in numbers to counter its regional competition 
with Pakistan, Russia, and China. Its ability to project its military limits its Army to 
deploying 63 tanks if all of its capable ships are loaded out simultaneously. This ability to 
deploy tanks is strikingly similar to Brazil’s capability.205  
2. China 
China is the richest and strongest member of the BRIC nations. In 2013, China’s 
GDP was $9 trillion, and its defense expenditure was approximately $146 billion. This puts 
the GDP and defense spending just over four times that of Brazil. The Chinese military is 
also unmatched on all fronts when compared to Brazil. The Chinese Navy has 235,000 
personnel, 70 submarines, and 70 surface combatants. Its Navy also has the ability to 
transfer approximately 300 tanks if all transport vessels are loaded out simultaneously. The 
Chinese Army has 1.6 million personnel and about 6800 tanks in its inventory. The 
Chinese Air Force has 398,000 personnel and 2200 combat aircraft. These capabilities give 
China the hard power capabilities of a regional power and a significant force as a global 
competitor to the United States. It would take Brazil years to produce a military of this size, 
even if it had an incentive to do so.206  
This chapter showed that Brazil is far from surpassing the military capabilities of 
the United States, China, Russia, and India. Brazil is slowly acquiring assets and 
technology, and it is increasing defense spending to give the perception of becoming a 
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comparable global power—as it remains a middle power in terms of its military strength. 
Its defense spending does not match up with the ambitions outlined in Brazilian foreign 
policy and the national security strategy. To build beyond the basic security forces in each 
branch service requires far more allocation of resources rather than spending close to 70 
percent of funding on personnel. Technology and future military assets will continue to be 
a pipedream if military expenditure does not undergo reform, and the stagnating economy 
will only present further challenges to acquiring these capabilities. For Brazil to achieve 
global power status, it would need approximately four times the military assets (including 
personnel), weapons grade nuclear technology, and stronger defense partnerships to allow 
for the development of its hard power capabilities. Since Brazil has the economic capacity 
but lacks the military capabilities for consideration as a global power, the final chapter 
assessed its soft power capabilities to determine its status in the international community. 
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IV. BRAZILIAN SOFT POWER PROJECTION  
Brazil is the most active Latin American country to exercise foreign policy outside 
of the region. With an active role in the UN, IMF, World Bank, peacekeeping operations, 
and various other international organizations, Brazil has a unique ability to project soft 
power as a global player. This ability to use soft power sets Brazil up as a global power 
despite its lack of military capabilities.   
This chapter will focus on soft power diplomacy and international influence 
measured through Brazil’s role in IOs, peacekeeping operations, trade, and cultural 
influence. These four aspects of international relations are indicators of exerting political 
and economic influence beyond the state and region. The four sections of this chapter aim 
to explain Brazil’s foreign policy in terms of liberalism and realism. The first section will 
provide an analysis of these two schools of thought in international relations that will 
provide the framework for assessing Brazil’s global power status vis-à-vis soft power. The 
second section assesses Brazil’s role in international organizations and participation in the 
IMF, World Bank, OAS, Unasur, and the UN. The third section will provide a brief history 
of Brazil’s peacekeeping involvement and its current operation in the United Nations 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The final section will assess trade among the emerging 
blocs and Brazil’s role, and will explain its level of regional and global influence vis-à-vis 
Mercosur. 
A. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FRAMEWORK 
Liberalism and realism are used in international relations to explain the how and 
why a state behaves in a particular way. John Mearsheimer argues that realism is the 
pessimistic view, and liberalism is the optimistic view.207 This section’s argument is that 
realism explains a state’s tendency for offensive or defensive behavior in relation to 
conflict within an anarchic world, and liberalism tends to explain why states do not resort 
to conflict. The first section will focus on the assumptions of offensive realism, the second 
on defensive realism, and the third on liberalism.   
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1. Offensive Realism 
Some of the basic assumptions of realism are that the international realm is 
anarchic, states are the central actor, and power is achieved through capabilities.208 As an 
offensive realist, Niccolo Machiavelli argues that the ends justify the means.209 Therefore, 
what constitutes ‘the right’ must derive from the interests of the state, and how the state 
justifies its existence is the important thing. With power and fear, a state can determine 
what is right. Some of the basic assumptions of realism are that the international realm is 
anarchic, states are the central actor, and power is achieved through capabilities. In 
Machiavelli’s world, states will continue to seek power and tend toward expansionist 
practices. Fear is also used to gain legitimacy similar to how a child obeys rules for fear of 
getting physically punished. The downside of realism in international relations is that is 
ruthless and amoral, and it does not explain why certain countries maintain peace—hence 
liberalism. If a state has the absolute power, for example the U.S., it is not accountable to 
anyone and can dictate how the international community works.   
2. Defensive Realism 
As a defensive realist, Kenneth Waltz argues that states seek power and capabilities 
in order to ensure survival.210 This theoretical approach assumes that the international 
realm is anarchic, and states are the primary actor; however, this approach typically leads to 
security dilemmas or arms races. A security dilemma is when one state increases its 
security, its neighbors view it as a threat, and that state increases its security. An example 
of defensive realism is that country A gains 100 new tanks and country B only has 60 
tanks. This increase in country A’s capabilities is a threat to country B. Therefore, country 
B decides to build 50 more tanks to ensure their own security and survival. Thus, Brazil’s 
foreign policy is driven by defensive realism as one of the most economically advanced 
and emerging powers. This is evident in the justification for increased military capabilities 
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and technology in the National Strategy of Defense for the protection and defense of off 
shore oil reserves/platforms, the Amazon, and border security.211 Brazil’s primary 
international relations revolve around a strong military force vis-à-vis internal and regional 
security cooperation. 
3. Liberalism 
The basic assumptions of liberalism are used to explain the process in which states 
use peaceful means to avoid conflict, and how individual values and morals explain their 
intent in international relations. Liberalism works on the basis that states are not the only 
important actor, and they continually seek cooperation, economic integration, and 
international organizations to co-exist. Subsequently, Bruce Russett argues that the Kantian 
triangle explains how peace is achieved through economic integration, democracy, and 
international organizations.212 Through these three tenets, states become economically 
driven with the intention of interdependence. State’s economies, interests, and security 
become intertwined through respective international organizations (International Monetary 
Fund, United Nations, and International Courts of Justice) thus removing anarchy and the 
need for war to resolve conflict. In the Kantian triangle, states will increase one of the three 
tenets (economic integration, democracy, or role in international organizations) to increase 
the peace. The downside to liberalism and the Kantian triangle is that they are idealistic, 
irrelevant in the time of conflict, and ultimately lead to more conflict because of a lack of 
legitimacy in international organizations for dispute settlement. From a liberal perspective, 
conflict is not in the best interest of a state because peace and economic prosperity can be 
achieved through cooperation where both parties benefit more; they give up relative power, 
and both sides gain more absolute power together. Consequently, all states use peaceful 
relations and trade to increase wealth. 
Overall, realism and liberalism share a few similar characteristics (power, anarchy, 
economics, states, cooperation), but they contrast on their intentions and importance of 
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each of these characteristics. Realism explains how states seek power, cooperation, and 
economics to ensure survival, expand, or deal with a viable threat in an anarchic world. 
Offensive realism explains how or why absolute power in the international system is 
desired, and how this power translates into setting the rules of the environment. For 
offensive realism, might makes right in the international system. Defensive realism 
explains a state’s foreign policy in terms of internal security, and it often leads to a security 
dilemma. Liberalism explains how states seek cooperation, economics, and power to co-
exist in a structured international society through international organizations. Realism often 
determines a state’s actions or foreign policy during conflict, and liberalism focuses on 
avoidance of conflict and perpetual peace through the characteristics in the Kantian 
triangle.   
B. ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
This section expounds on Brazils role in the IMF, World Bank, and WTO during 
its development as a consolidated democracy. The last section shows that Brazil’s 
economic achievements have translated into a development model throughout Africa.  
This section is important to understand the global reach of Brazil in the international 
community beyond the Latin American region.  
1. IMF 
The global financial crisis in 2008 sparked a change in the international community. 
The G-8 expanded into the G-20, which is composed of the world’s leading economic 
powers. The G-20 accounts for approximately 80 percent of world trade and two-thirds of 
the global population. With Brazil, India and China being relatively unaffected by the 
global financial crises, Harold Trinkunas argues that each of these countries gained 
additional support and voice within the IMF.213 Additionally, Brazil’s ability to shift from 
borrower status to guarantor of loans within the IMF and its increased credit worthiness 
enabled a growing voting weight on the executive board. According to the IMF, the 
percentage of voting share puts none of the BRIC members in the top five: U.S. holds 
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16.75, China 3.65, Russia 2.39, India 2.34, and Brazil 1.74 percent of the voting share. 
Although Brazil is gaining additional voting presence in the IMF, it globally ranks 14th 
with almost a comparable share to Mexico, which holds 1.47 percent of the vote. Brazil’s 
overall role in the IMF is merely a sign of its middle power status as it has half of the votes 
allocated to each of the top five vote holders: U.S., Japan, Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom.214   
2. World Bank 
Brazil’s role in the World Bank is similar to the IMF. The major difference between 
the IMF and World Bank is that China holds a spot in the top five voting stakeholders. 
Brazil did increase its voting share approximately .25 percent in 2010; however, that figure 
remains close to half the amount of overall votes compared to the top five voting 
shareholders. According to Trinkunas, “Its [Brazil’s] national development bank, BNDES, 
is a very significant player in both internal and regional development, with a total lending 
volume three times that of the World Bank in 2011.”215 As Brainard and Martinez-Diaz 
note, BNDES increased outward foreign direct investment from $69 to $112 billion 
between 2001 and 2005, and its primary investors were Petrobras (oil company) and Vale 
(mining company).216 BNDES has also turned toward increasing the overall credit volume 
aimed at companies willing to invest in Africa. Stolte points out that this credit limit was 
worth $146 million in 2007 and topped out at $766 million in 2009, which were aimed at 
improving construction and engineering of African industry and agriculture.217 The 
investments in the World Bank and credit from BNDES toward Africa are just an example 
of Brazil’s ability to project influence in the global arena. 
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3. World Trade Organization 
Another example of Brazil’s global influence is in the WTO with the ability to 
exercise dispute settlements. Brazil was a complainant in 25, a respondent in 14, and a third 
party in 64 cases from 1995–2011, where retaliatory measures were authorized in two 
cases.218 For example, the U.S. was forced to pay cotton subsidies to Brazilian farmers, and 
Canada was forced to pay aircraft export subsidies after dispute settlements went in favor 
of Brazil. The ability to use the WTO and the laws governing the global economy are just 
one example of Brazil’s ability to project soft power against a world power.    
4. Development Model 
With Brazil’s increasing role in international organizations, it has further 
legitimized its leadership on global issues such as poverty, health, and energy. Stolte argues 
that Brazil used its history as a ‘developing turned emerging’ power to demonstrate to its 
African partners that it understands the challenges and problems associated with 
development. Therefore, Brazil feels it knows better than any other state to overcome state 
hardship through its successful models of developmental aid acquisition and utilization, 
social programs, and poverty reduction programs. Brazilian Enterprise for Agricultural 
Research (EMBRAPA) is a state-owned company affiliated with the Ministry of 
Agriculture that opened an African office in 2008. EMBRAPA provides technical 
assistance and agricultural know-how to improve farming as a grassroots means of fighting 
against hunger and poverty. A speech from José Graziano da Silva, the director general of 
the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, stated that “the number of new technical co-
operation projects initiated by Brazil rose from 23 in 2003 to 413 in 2009.”219 This 
cooperation aims to enhance every aspect of agriculture from seeds, planting, and post-
harvest techniques to shift Africa from being a net importer to an agricultural power similar 
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to Brazil.220 Additionally, Brazil counseled its African partners on the successful 
implementation of social programs such as Bolsa Família and Zero Hunger program.  
This Brazil-African relationship goes beyond agriculture and social programs. This 
relationship maintains a strong health component, especially as it pertains to a mutual 
problem for both regions with HIV/AIDS prevention. Brazil has 53 bilateral agreements on 
health topics with 22 African countries, and it has made efforts to establish national 
institutes of health.221 An HIV/AIDS pharmaceutical factory was also established in 
Lusophone, Africa, aimed at implementing education and prevention campaigns similar to 
those in Brazil, which included nationwide distribution of condoms, HIV testing, and AIDS 
treatment. In short, Brazil’s role in Africa is an example of standardizing a development 
model for the third world nations. Brazil has provided assistance to alleviate some of the 
similar barriers it experienced during its emerging and developing stages without pushing 
Brazilian foreign policy on Africa. There is little doubt that Brazil has secured itself as a 
leading economic power in the global arena, and it is in the beginning stages of spreading 
its influence outside of the Latin American region.   
C. SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS 
This section expounds on the role of Brazil in security organizations. The first 
section describes Brazil’s role in the Organization of American States and how this 
organization is not achieving any results.  The ineffectiveness of the OAS shows that 
Brazil is distancing itself from the organization as a means to create other security 
cooperation avenues in Latin America.  The second section assess Brazils role in 
UNASUR and CELAC as alternatives to the OAS, but these organizations are fairly new 
and have not been tested as a global or regional security agreement.  The final section 
assesses Brazil’s role in the United Nations and its desire to become a permanent member 
of the Security Council.   
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1. Organization of American States 
Many of the Latin American countries lack the material capabilities to fight major 
conflicts to settle disputes. These countries instead kept to a liberal approach and utilized 
institutions as a legalistic means to settle disputes—an attempt for peace through 
international organizations. Dispute settlements were taken to the UN International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) in countries like Nicaragua, Ecuador, and El Salvador. These three 
countries assumed a liberal approach to dispute settlement because they exhausted all other 
means or were not capable of exerting power over each other to establish their territorial 
claims and sovereignty.222  
These small states (Nicaragua, Ecuador, and El Salvador) wanted recognition for 
what they believed was their territorial claim, but without having the material capabilities, 
the options were slim. The first option would be to ask the U.S. to intervene, another would 
be to use physical force to take control of the territory, and the last would be to turn to 
international or regional organizations to make a determination. According to Carolyn 
Shaw, the Organization of American States (OAS) is a Latin American-based forum 
created to prevent disagreements between states and extra-hemispheric intervention.223 A 
unified LATAM through international organizations, similar to the OAS, was able to settle 
26 conflicts peacefully between 1948 and 1989 without U.S. involvement.224 Nicaragua, 
Ecuador, and El Salvador were unable to settle their disputes using IO and RO. These 
countries needed a forum with more judicial and legitimate power for enforcement—hence 
they used the ICJ. This institution’s legalistic nature for dispute settlement was viewed as 
legitimate and shows how weaker states choose judicial means vice conflict because of the 
recognized legitimacy it brings to the international realm—a liberal approach to foreign 
policy. 
The major issue with the OAS is the exertion of U.S. hegemony and the 
ineffectiveness of the organization. The major purpose of the OAS was to promote 
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democracy and strengthen the peace and security of the continent. To promote democracy, 
the OAS provide election monitors to ensure free and fair elections, and it condemns those 
states in violation as well as any other democracies that are overthrown by force. The major 
issue is that election monitors must be requested, and most states don’t want to be 
condemned in the international community for being a fraudulent democracy.  
International election monitoring (IEM) is an international norm that started in 
LATAM, reinforced territorial sovereignty, and allowed for a colloquial transition to 
democratization in the region, which was first introduced through the OAS. Arturo Santa-
Cruz defines IEM as the practice of inviting third party organizations such as non-
governmental, international non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations to 
assess a state’s election process.225 Since IEM did not arise until the 1960s, the 1948 OAS 
charter signed in Bogotá was one of the first attempts at instilling sovereignty, democracy, 
and integration in LA.226 In this case, sovereignty is freedom from external control, 
democracy results from free and fair elections, and integration is through OAS 
membership. The 1959 Declaration of Santiago established that the American republics 
result from free and fair elections, and an amendment from the OAS in 1985 added the 
promotion of democracy.227 The following are components of democracy: free and fair 
elections, citizens can vote, citizens can run for political office, competitive election 
process, politicians held accountable for decisions, politicians have free access to media, 
and no reserved domains exist (no political figures with special rights).228 Therefore, 
competition is the basis for democratic elections, and IEM is the means to constrain the 
competition through monitoring the aforementioned elements of democracy.  
The examples of where the norm of IEM emerged and transformed to an 
international regime are seen in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. 
Shortly after a coup overthrew the authoritarian regime and instituted democratic reforms, 
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Costa Rica was the preliminary government to use IEM in 1962 when it requested the OAS 
election monitors.229 As a democratizing state, Costa Rica invited electoral observance 
from a non-biased party to reinforce its sovereignty and ensure a free and fair election.230 
Although the OAS only assists and intervenes in sovereign states, its foundation rests in 
reinforcing territorial sovereignty and democracy. Therefore, Costa Rica’s invitation to the 
OAS set precedence for an authoritative and legitimized institution to monitor the 
democratic process—thus legitimizing sovereignty and democracy during democratization. 
Subsequently, the OAS denied the Dominican Republic observers for elections in 1960 
because it had not fully democratized; however, upon instilling its democratic reform in 
1961 as an emerging democratic state, the OAS recognized the government’s authority and 
sent observers.231 As a result, IEM reinforced the Dominican Republic’s sovereignty and 
gained international recognition. In addition, Honduras and Nicaragua also invited the OAS 
to observe elections the following year. As free and fair elections are now a necessary 
component of democracy, IEM is the international norm from LA that created a check and 
balance system for the election process in democratic states. In the 1980s, Jimmy Carter’s 
administration founded the Carter Center and similar INGOs emerged as a result of Latin 
America’s success with IEM—a second wave of IEM.232 In 1990, over 2500 observers 
from 200 IEM organizations monitored the elections in Nicaragua. Subsequently, this Latin 
American-based norm enhanced IEM as an international regime, institutionalized a 
monitoring process during the third wave of democracy, and legitimized the democratic 
election process.233 Overall, the OAS has been used for dispute settlements, election 
monitoring, and to promote democracy, but Latin America views it as just another 
extension of the United States hegemony in the region. Consequently, Brazil has 
historically desired an alternative to the OAS to exert its hegemony in the region.  
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As an alternative to the OAS, Brazil has created both the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) and the South American Defense Council (CSD). Brands notes, “the 
CSD is a still-nascent project that may eventually lead to more military-to-military 
contacts, more combined exercises, more collaboration on drug trafficking and other 
common threats, and less U.S. influence in South American defense affairs.”234  
2. Union of South American Nations 
Brazil has exerted its hegemonic influence in the Latin American region vis-à-vis 
UNASUR, but this regional organization lacks international acceptance in the global arena. 
UNASUR and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (CELAC) are 
intergovernmental organizations aimed at South American integration with the first linking 
Mercosur and the Andean Community of Nations, and the latter supporting regional 
integration with the inclusion of the Caribbean states. Both organizations exclude the 
United States, Canada, and other states under sovereign control of a non-Latin American 
nation.   
Brazil initiated UNASUR and CELAC as a means to exclude the U.S., Mexico, 
Canada, and Central America and exert its influence in the Latin American region. Since 
2008, Brazil has taken the leading role in dispute settlements on two occasions. The first 
was after a Colombian airstrike on a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia 
encampment in Ecuador, and the second was during the 2009 coup in Honduras.235 
Additionally, Venezuela has called on UNASUR to send its foreign ministers in hope of 
determining a viable solution to the increasing protests and violence since the fall of Hugo 
Chavez.236 UNASUR in this sense gives LATAM an alternative to OAS and direct United 
States’ influence in the region, while giving Brazil more power in the region. The downside 
to this organization as Trinkunas points out is that UNASUR lacks adequate funding and 
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previously established organizations provide the same services.237 For example, UNASUR 
and CELAC do not legally or politically replace MERCOSUR, OAS, or any other regional 
trade bloc; and the U.S., EU, and China still conduct trade relations through bilateral or 
unilateral agreements. UNASUR is shaping its organizational structure to mimic that of the 
EU with the South American Defense Council (CSD), the South American Council of 
Health (UNASUR-Health), the Council of Economy and Finance, and other specialized 
bodies, such the Electoral Council. For now, UNASUR and CELAC remain nothing more 
than organizations aimed at political cooperation according to post-liberal regionalism.238  
Brazil will be able to exert its influence as a global power if it can continually lead 
UNASUR and CELAC and their associated ministries, effectively establish itself as a 
regionally integrated union for LATAM, and begins to deal directly with other regional or 
international organizations. Finally, UNASUR and CELAC offer little to the relevance of 
Brazil as a global power because these organizations lack operations of importance and 
relevance in the international arena, while continuing to focus on regional issues that 
existing organizations exist for. If Brazil were a global power, it would have complete 
dominance of any regional organization created in or for Latin America with the ability to 
exert these organizations internationally.   
3. United Nations 
Stephanie Neumann argues that because of anarchy, or lack of central government, 
“states must rely on their own capabilities to defend themselves.”239 During WWII, Brazil 
viewed the war as a means to gain power by increasing its influence over others and 
exercised finite cooperation with the U.S. to enhance its material capabilities.240 Brazil’s 
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geographical location during WWII provided the U.S. with an ideal launching pad for 
planes, supplies, and forces into Africa—ultimately an ideal route to access Europe.241 As a 
result, Brazil used this opportunity to receive economic and military aid to increase military 
strength. Another example of Brazil’s power was to be one of the only Latin American 
countries to send troops to Europe during WWII.242 With economic and military aid from 
the U.S., Brazil became industrialized, gained strength in the Southern Cone, and emerged 
as a military power in LATAM. Brazil’s incentives to join in WWII and form an alliance 
with the U.S. were based on a realist motivation to increase material capabilities. Brazil 
ultimately distanced itself from the U.S. in the 1970s because of President Carter’s human 
rights policy. This alliance was severed because Brazil saw itself as an emerging power and 
did not want the U.S. to intervene in Latin American cases of human rights violations. This 
anti-U.S. stance was merely a show of Brazil’s influence and defiance of a great power 
when the military regime was at its strongest point.      
The United Nations was founded on liberal ideology as a means for collective 
security and cooperation among the great powers after WWII. The continued U.S. 
involvement in the United Nations is based on realism and liberalism. The first section will 
focus on the realist argument, and the second section will turn toward the liberal argument. 
Based on David Carr’s critique of liberal institutionalism and realism, it is impossible to 
seek morality of the world while pursuing the greatest good of the individual state and its 
citizens. 
From a realist perspective, the U.S. continues involvement in the UN as an 
extension of its power and influence throughout the international community. The majority 
of the humanitarian and peacekeeping operations funding comes from the U.S. economy, 
which is arguably to alleviate the international burden of peace from the U.S. If the U.S. 
were the sole international security force, it would eventually fall victim to what Davide 
Fiammenghi calls imperial overstretch—expanding itself beyond its ability to expand or 




maintain.243 The U.S. also continues to play the game within the UN; however, the U.S. 
still invaded Iraq without the support of the Security Council showing that the U.S. only 
cares about involvement in the UN when it suits its own self-interests. Brands points out 
that President Lula strongly advocated against any U.S. action in Iraq through the UN, and 
how military intervention should only be carried out if sanctioned by the Security 
Council.244 The U.S. also uses the UN to deal with issues that are irrelevant to the security 
of itself and its allies—i.e., human rights. As the U.S. continues to fight the global war on 
terrorism and spread democracy around the world, the UN is merely a tool to allow other 
states to feel as if they have a voice. The General Assembly is not even allowed to make 
recommendations to the Security Council in the event of disputes. The Security Council 
itself is made up of the five major powers and requires a minimum of 3 votes to pass any 
policy; however, three of these powers will always vote with the U.S. or abstain leaving the 
China and Russia with little ability to exude any power within the council. The downside to 
the realist perspective is that the U.S. should not need an international organization to 
exude its power and influence; however, the UN is merely an extension of U.S. power.   
From a liberal perspective, the U.S. continues involvement in the UN as a means of 
cooperation and maintaining peace. According to the Kantian triangle, the use of 
international organizations, economic interdependence, and democracy together will lead to 
peace.245 The UN is organized to encompass each of these characteristics with the Security 
Council, Economic and Social Council, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The 
General Assembly and Security Council are admittance to the UN as an international 
organization, which bounds each member to a certain set of liberal perspectives. The 
Economic and Social Council are responsible for cooperation between states on economic 
and social fields to raise the general standard of living, solve economic, social and health 
problems, promotion of human rights, and humanitarian aid. The ICJ is used for dispute 
settlement and maintaining international law. The U.S. is able to make the largest impact 
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on democratic states through the UN, and it alleviates two sides of the Kantian triangle that 
makes peace attainable through economics. The U.S. is also able to use the UN as an 
unbiased international organization to spread democracy and humanitarian assistance 
across the globe. Ultimately, the U.S. continues involvement in the UN to provide an 
organization to foster peace, cooperation, and interdependence. 
Brazil’s desire to become a permanent member of the UNSC is also part of a realist 
strategy in its foreign policy. A liberal would argue that IOs and regional organizations 
(ROs) are a tool of the weak, but Brazil’s motivation for becoming a permanent member of 
the UNSC stays true to the realist paradigm. After WWII, Mexico and Brazil were invited 
to join the original UN Security Council for their involvement in the war. The UNSC has 5 
permanent members that are arguably the major powers of the world and have nuclear 
technology. Brazil was elected as non-permanent member of UNSC 10 times since its 
creation—the most of any Latin American country. The UNSC is also an IO capable of 
enforcement and brings the major powers to a level playing ground. This is evident in the 
fact that a single power cannot control the outcomes of the UNSC and all governments 
represented have an equal vote and only a handful have veto power. 
To facilitate a permanent position in the UNSC, Brazil is increasing its military 
capabilities. According to Hal Brands, Brazil “is not simply purchasing equipment, it is 
also negotiating agreements that will allow it to develop its military industrial base and 
eventually eliminate any dependence on foreign suppliers.”246 This coincides with Brazil’s 
protectionist market strategies and use of import-substitution industrialization. Acquiring a 
nuclear submarine and the technology of advanced weaponry through strategic alliances is 
what Brazil views as its ticket to a permanent UNSC seat. In 2008, Brazil’s Navy Chief of 
Staff argued, “those who have nuclear submarines sit on the United Nations Security 
Council.”247   
If Brazil could secure a permanent seat, it would have international recognition as a 
major power—a realist motivation in foreign policy. This recognition would then gain 
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Brazil a considerable amount of legitimacy among the international community. The 
permanent seat at the UNSC can also be viewed as a form of balancing or opposing U.S. 
hegemonic influence to increase Brazil’s influential power internationally. The quest for 
recognition as a global power and opposition to the U.S., are arguably Brazil’s two reasons 
for its desire toward a permanent seat in the UNSC—a realistic form of foreign policy.248 
As it continually strives toward the achievement of international influence through the UN, 
Brazil has the largest military presence and is leading the reconstruction efforts in the 
United Nations Mission in Haiti after the devastating 2010 earthquake.   
D. TRADE  
This section assess Brazils role in the South American Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) and Brazils trade partnerships. MERCOSUR as a regional trade bloc 
presents challenges to Brazil’s desire for global power. This section shows that 
MERCOSUR limits Brazil’s international trade agenda and hinders its emergence as a 
global economic power.   
1. Mercosur 
MERCOSUR was created as a Bolivarian ideal to counter U.S. hegemony in the 
global market. According to Arie Kacowicz, Bolivarianism is a regional belief of anti-
American nationalism, and Mercosur is a trade bloc established in 1991 between Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.249 After the Cold War created a politically unstable 
international community, Peter Smith points out, “the U.S. emerged as one of the three 
major economic powers, and in 1990, the United States GDP was 33 times that of 
Argentina, 13 times that of Brazil, 23 times that of Mexico.”250 Mercosur emerged as a 
trading bloc during the debt crisis surrounding this economic disparity, and it created a 
need for liberalization and economic integration.  
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The examples of the Bolivarian norm emerging and transforming in LATAM are 
seen in Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela with the creation of Mercosur and the Bolivarian 
Alternative to the Americas (ALBA)—both in response to U.S. hegemonic influence. From 
the U.S. perspective, the Washington Consensus was in full effect attempting to create a 
U.S.-led Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).251 The FTAA would have liberalized 
trade throughout Americas, and further enabled the U.S. to instill its hegemonic influence. 
Latin American countries, however, incurred a tremendous amount of debt in the 1980s 
because they lacked the market to exploit their own resources and collect the resources 
necessary for development.252 Free trade with the United States would have increased the 
overall GDP of LATAM, but it would have also created an additional amount of 
dependency on the North American market. 
The fear of LA succumbing to the U.S. was an undesirable option for Brazil. As 
continually seeking international recognition as an emerging power, Brazil was a driving 
force behind the creation and implementation of Mercosur. Mercosur created a market for 
integration and competition against U.S. hegemony for the developing nations. Peter Smith 
describes the four Latin American options that developing nations have for economic 
integration as bandwagon with the American market, create a regional market, seek extra-
hemispheric integration, or take a unilateral approach.253 Argentina and Brazil decided on 
option two, and initiated Mercosur’s economic integration that increased the regions total 
GDP in 1990—1995 from $17 billion to $714 billion as the fourth largest trading bloc in the 
world.254 This bloc allowed for a free trade area within Latin America, opposed the U.S. 
dominated global economy, and increased trading opportunities with other trading blocs 
and countries.  
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A year after the emergence of MERCOSUR, the U.S. responded with the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, and the European Union emerged in 1994.255 With the 
MERCOSUR market as opposition to the U.S., Hugo Chavez also followed with ALBA.256 
MERCOSUR and ALBA soon became the primary catalysts allowing the developing 
nations of LATAM to oppose a U.S. led free trade area with a Brazilian-led Mercosur 
market. This opposition to the U.S. arguably promotes a long-standing belief of non-
intervention and Bolivarianism in Latin American. Ultimately, Brazil views itself as a 
major economic competitor with the ability to oppose U.S. hegemony.  
Mostly dominated by Brazil and Argentina, MERCOSUR has increased free trade 
across the borders of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela. In addition to liberalization, 
MERCOSUR has opened the Southern Cone to the international trading market. According 
to the Inter-American Development Bank, MERCOSUR’s largest trading partner in 1994 
was the European Union at 30 percent instead of the United States that dominated the 
global economy.257 Among other trading partners to diversify MERCOSUR’s markets are 
China, Japan, Caricom, and South Africa was added as a free trade agreement in 2000. This 
level of international relations and economic diversity allows the weak and less capable 
countries like Uruguay and Paraguay to rely on the political stability of a more capable 
Brazil through membership in Mercosur.   
Without a strong economic power, these countries would not be considered in the 
world trade because they lack the amount of material goods individually to be relevant 
among the great powers. Subsequently, the use of MERCOSUR as an international 
organization is a liberal attempt to integrate economies of the weak countries that lack the 
material capabilities to form a bloc worthy of competition among the elite. Ultimately, the 
countries that form Mercosur endured the third wave of democracy in the 1980s, achieved 
economic integration in the 1990s, and utilized international organizations through trade 
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blocs and the Organization of American States (OAS) since its founding in 1948 for 
dispute settlements.   
Brazil’s role in multilateral trade organizations and pursuit of regional hegemony 
contradict the idea of common good and self-interests. Brazil is unwilling to surrender its 
power and sovereignty to a judicial or legislative body. To form a multilateral or regional 
coalition, each country gives up a certain portion of sovereignty under the notion that each 
member will benefit mutually. Brazil does not want to succumb to the power of another 
regional Latin American state. Therefore, its interest in regional integration vis-à-vis 
MERCOSUR is to increase its influence, and not for the common good of LATAM.258  
MERCOSUR also presents challenges to Brazil’s desire for global power. First, 
Brazil is prohibited from seeking bilateral or unilateral trade agreements without the 
consensus of the MERCOSUR member states. With Argentina and Venezuela as two of the 
most troubled economies in Latin America, Brazil’s leadership has often ignored the rules 
governing the regional trade bloc. Additionally, Brazil has attempted to obtain an FTA with 
the EU, which was unsuccessful due to lack of consensus within MERCOSUR. 
Considering the creation of UNASUR to encompass MERCOSUR as one of its internal 
ministries, UNASUR still places it as a regionally focused organization with little relevance 
to Brazil’s rise. Consequently, Brands argues that Brazil’s diplomacy and trade policies are 
self-interested, thus limit their chance for global power to regional hegemony at best. With 
UNASUR and MERCOSUR unable to establish free trade zones and free trade agreements 
within the Latin American region, Brazil should consider the effectiveness of these regional 
trade blocs. Additionally, countries like Mexico that already sided with the North American 
giant and Chile that initiated a completely liberalized market show that the Latin American 
region is far too diverse in their political and economic stance in terms of liberalization. 
The overall global system appears to be shifting toward regional trade blocs with NAFTA 
and the EU as the two major players, and Brazil needs to exert its leadership in UNASUR 
or MERCOSUR to join the party or be left behind.  
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This chapter assessed Brazil’s soft power diplomacy and global influence through 
its role in international and regional organizations. Having the economic power and lacking 
the military capabilities of a global power, Brazil’s ability to exert influence is limited to 
regional and international organizations. In other words, Brazil does not inherently possess 
the ability to directly influence other world powers. Its influence indirectly influences the 
behavior of other nations through international organizations and laws established at the 
global level. The economic success over the last 20 years is garnering an increased voting 
share in several organizations: IMF, World Bank, WTO. Brazil is also able to take 
countries like the United States and Canada to dispute settlements. Brazil’s limitation is 
that it lacks the ability to change the rules of the game in the international arena. Brazil, like 
all nations, is merely using the system to its benefit, and it will continue to do so long as it 
does not have to actually take full responsibility. The internal dilemmas in Brazil present a 
tough challenge for diplomats and public officials to further international aid, military 
acquisitions, and development programs when there is not a direct impact on the security of 
the Brazilian state or its national interests. This is why Brazil has historically possessed an 
internally focused foreign policy and protectionist market strategy as it continues to act as a 




This thesis analyzed three primary and fungible aspects of Brazilian power: wealth 
(GDP/purchasing power/population size), land power (resources/military strength/energy 
consumption), and international influence (trade/role in IOs/alliances). Wealth, land power, 
and international influence were evaluated as the quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
power to understand if Brazil has achieved global power status given its recent economic 
expansion. Trinkunas argues, “A major power is characterized by more than size, 
population, and economic achievement.”259 Brazil has all of these three characteristics and 
it’s beginning to exert influence in the regional and global levels. Chapter I outlined three 
probable hypotheses for Brazils status. The first hypothesis is that Brazil is a global or 
world power. Second, that Brazil is a middle power. Third, Brazil is a regional power.  
Chapter II assessed the extent to which domestic factors shape and influence the 
role of Brazil in world affairs, and the domestic political and political economic factors that 
contributed to neoliberal reform in Brazil. The analysis explained gradual market reform 
and shock therapy as the two most popular paths to economic growth that Brazil attempted 
during its military rule, transition to democracy, and consolidation of democracy phases. 
First, this chapter argued that economic crisis and an ideational approach (learning from 
previous mistakes) are the primary contributing factors to neo-liberal reform and the 
economic success of the Brazilian economy. Subsequently, this economic success provides 
the foundation for the argument of Brazil as a global power. Furthermore, the economic 
success of Brazil enables it to extend diplomatic influence through trade and partnerships. 
Overall, neoliberal reform explains how Brazil became open to trade; trade and 
partnerships provides a description of one dimension of Brazil’s power in the global arena. 
Finally, the emergence of Brazil as a competitive global market contributes to a shift in the 
international balance of power from a bipolar/unipolar to a multipolar system.   
In the last 50 years, Brazil experienced periods of high economic growth, followed 
by recession, because its economy was reliant on the commodities market. When 
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commodities prices dropped, Brazil’s economy would suffer. To alleviate this pressure, 
Brazil diversified its trade partnerships and began to exert its influence in the global 
economy. The choice for neoliberal reform in Brazil went back and forth between drastic 
shock therapy and gradual market reform. The latter became the best choice, in the 1990s, 
with the Real Plan because the government learned from the previous failures of the shock 
therapy programs.   
The Brazilian economy and its ability to exert influence through dispute settlements 
are the only examples of its ability to force another country outside of the Latin American 
region to do what it would not otherwise do on its own. The awarding of subsides with 
cotton and aviation exports/imports supports the notion that Brazil influenced another 
global power. This ability is more of an example that Brazil is a developed nation with a 
strong economy, and further influence of global powers may support the notion of an 
expansion as a global power.  
The EU, China, and Africa offer Brazil opportunities for future economic growth, 
but each partnership presents challenges as well. During last decade, Brazil has performed, 
developed, and sustained economic growth that has placed it as the seventh largest 
economy in the world. The consolidation of democracy and good economic policy show 
that Brazil is a rising economic power with diminishing debt and increasing surpluses. 
Internal dilemmas of income distribution, high taxes, and infrastructure deficiencies will 
continue to plague the country. Once Brazil is able to overcome these issues, it may gain 
more recognition as a world power. For now, Brazil will continue to be considered an 
emerging power or middle power alongside the other BRIC nations as it continues the 
quest to overcome the hegemony of the U.S. Improved relations with the U.S. may help to 
overcome this hurdle, but Brazil must be willing to align for or against the U.S. This means 
that Brazil must be willing to move away from its middle power and inward focused 
strategy and forge stronger foreign relations with or against the world powers. These 
relationships will give Brazil more diplomatic power alongside its economic power as a 
major hegemon among the world’s elite countries. Based on the economy and trade, Brazil 
is far from reaching global power status, and it remains a middle power, which supports 
hypothesis two and three. 
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Chapter III assessed three aspects of Brazil’s hard power capabilities: military 
spending, defense partnerships, and fungible assets. The economic capacity and military 
spending distinctly separates Brazil from the rest of LATAM. Out of the BRIC nations, 
India is the closest comparison in GDP and defense spending. Russia has a comparable 
GDP to Brazil, but spends roughly twice as much on its military. Similar to the United 
States, China has a significantly larger economy and higher expenditure in defense than 
Brazil, which shows that these two characteristics are necessary for global power status. 
Brazil has the largest GDP and spends the most in terms of defense expenditure in Latin 
America, but it is far from reaching global power status in these categories. Brazil’s major 
limitation in defense spending is that it allocates almost three quarters of its budget to 
personnel. The defense spending requires more of a percentage of the overall GDP 
allocated to defense spending, which will allow Brazil to gain the assets and technology for 
global power status.   
Brazil is using defense partnerships to transfer technology, but the nuclear and 
aviation additions will not be in service for at least another 10 to 20 years. The internal 
development of enriched uranium to fuel its future nuclear submarine is also not a 
guarantee. This is where additional defense partnerships could help to fill the gap in 
technology as Brazil strives for nuclear capabilities.  
Brazil’s fungible assets (actual military assets) have led to an increase in defense 
spending, and the size of its armed forces has Brazil as the strongest military state in Latin 
America. On the other hand, Brazil’s military force is years away from procuring a larger 
force than the other BRIC nations. As of the data presented in Jane’s and SIPRI, Brazil 
possesses enough military personnel and defense assets to defend itself from an invasion 
from any of the major world powers based on the ability to forward deploy tanks and 
personnel by the respective Naval vessels—except the United States. To gain a global 
power status, Brazil requires the ability to project hard power capabilities beyond the Latin 
American region. Brazilian military capabilities place it as a well-developed middle power 
or regional power, which supports hypothesis two and three.   
Brazil’s role in international organizations fails to support the notion under the 
Kantian triangle. The Kantian triangle proposes that states will seek activity in IOs that 
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other democratic global powers are in. Brazil has continually sought to create IOs with the 
CLEC and UNASUR as opposition entities to the hegemony of the United States. If Brazil 
was concerned with perpetual peace and global power status, it would seek more influence 
or position in the OAS and United Nations. UNASUR and CLEC were both create to 
exclude the United States, Canada, and other global powers. Although Brazil was active in 
the United Nations with its peacekeeping operations in Haiti, this exertion of influence was 
after years of failure to rebuild Haiti from a plethora of multinational organizations and 
nations.   
Chapter IV assessed Brazil’s soft power diplomacy and global influence through its 
role in international and regional organizations. Having the economic power and lacking 
the military capabilities of a global power, Brazil’s ability to exert influence is limited to 
regional and international organizations. In other words, Brazil does not inherently possess 
the ability to directly influence other world powers. Its influence indirectly influences the 
behavior of other nations through international organizations and laws established at the 
global level. The economic success over the last 20 years is garnering an increased voting 
share in several organizations: IMF, World Bank, WTO. Brazil is also able to take 
countries like the United States and Canada to dispute settlements. Brazil’s limitation is 
that it lacks the ability to change the rules of the game in the international arena. Brazil, like 
all nations, is using the system to its benefit, and it will continue to do so long as it does not 
have to actually take full responsibility. The internal dilemmas in Brazil present a tough 
challenge for diplomats and public officials to further international aid, military 
acquisitions, and development programs when there is not a direct impact on the security of 
the Brazilian state or its national interests. This is why Brazil has historically possessed an 
internally focused foreign policy and protectionist market strategy as it continues to act as a 
middle power, which supports hypothesis two and three. Ultimately, Brazil is a well-
developed nation with middle and regional power status, and it will continue to have 
ambitions toward a global power status.  
In summary, Brazil has the ability to influence states in the Latin American region, 
but it is in the beginning stages of its global influence.  The strongest area for Brazilian 
influence globally is through its economic strength, which it will continue to attempt to 
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change the international rules of the game or the actions of other states against its interests. 
Militarily, Brazil is and will continue to be a regional/middle power based on its focus 
toward internal and national security. Brazil also lacks an ability to project force outside of 
LATAM; however, it possess a large enough force to prevent an invasion from most global 
powers—primary exception being the United States. When and if UNASUR and CELAC 
are able to exert influence outside of the Latin American region then Brazil may have an 
opportunity to exert political or military influence globally. Building alliances with or 
against the United States is Brazil’s strategic option to rival the current global powers 
militarily. Most of the global powers have been challenged in war, thus giving them an 
opportunity to express hard power where Brazil has not. Finally, for Brazil to have enough 
influence to be considered a global power, it should use its political and economic success 
as a development model for failing or struggling states around the globe—similar to its 
recent developing relations with smaller African states and its operations in Haiti. For now, 
Brazil will continue to be plagued as the country of the future or a middle power with 
global aspirations.     
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